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FELLOW-FEELING AND GENDER IN THE
LAW OF PERSONAL INJURY
Anita Bernstein *
Whenever authorities instruct audiences about the law that
American courts apply-in civics lessons, in speeches to the
public, and to students in law schools, as well as in the scripted
instructions written for a jury-they typically emphasize the
tenet of impartiality. Impartiality underlies fairness, justice, and
intelligibility in any legal system. Law in the United States holds
this value in writing, at the core of the nation's foundational
documents.'
The obligation of impartiality gives direction to partisans as
well as neutrals. Judges famously must eschew "bias or
prejudice" and maintain an open mind in considering issues that
may come before them, and they instruct jurors accordingly.2
Participants who take the role of an advocate-attorneys for
clients, legal scholars with agendas, law students ordered to
argue for one side-succeed or fail based on how well they can
* Anita and Stuart Subotnick Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
My thanks to colleagues at Brooklyn Law School and the Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law for the valuable comments they gave me at workshops, and
to Alan Calnan for suggesting that I explore asbestos liability. I also
appreciate the constructive feedback I received from Elizabeth Schneider,
Edward Cheng, Margaret Berger, Michael Green, and Victoria Szymczak.
Editorial work by, and my conversations with, Jonathan Sabin and Lauren
Numeroff of the Journal of Law and Policy greatly improved this Article.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating a right to "an impartial jury");
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (including, in a roster of
complaints, a protest that the King of Great Britain had attacked judicial
independence, established disingenuous trials, deprived Americans of trial by
jury, and responded unfairly to petitions for redress).
2 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3 (2007).
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persuade neutral auditors. Advocates strive to move the
impartial. Persuasion occurs when an auditor shifts from
neutrality to the belief that one and only one of the two sides
should win.3
Impartiality takes on a pointed aspect in private litigation,
where each winner is matched with at least one loser. A failure
of impartiality in an adjudicated civil case means that one side
has enjoyed undue favor, while the other side suffered from
undue disfavor. Impartial decisionmakers, for their part, should
be moved to support one adversary over the other by facts or
argument, rather than what standard instructions tell jurors to
put aside: their "personal likes or dislikes, opinions, prejudices,
or sympathy. ,
4
Personal injury litigation has provoked particular suspicion
about partiality rooted in sympathy. Critics of American tort law
have argued that sympathy causes juries and judges to veer from
the neutrality that should be their signature characteristic, and
that this veering brings havoc to the rule of law.' Sympathy, in
this view, leads to baseless determinations of responsibility, and
damage awards that are excessively large. It also fosters
nuisance value for cases that do not deserve to go to trial. Civil
litigants in the United States have a right to jury adjudication
that is not recognized in most other countries, where judges
' On the presence of justice in this construct, see D.D. RAPHAEL, THE
IMPARTIAL SPECTATOR: ADAM SMITH'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY 134-45 (2007),
explaining moral philosophy with reference to conscience, which in turn
responds to "feelings of approval and disapproval by disinterested
spectators."
4 United States v. Grace, 408 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1000 (D. Mont. 2006),
rev'd on other grounds, 493 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2007); accord State v.
Kelly, 942 A.2d 440, 454 (Conn. App. 2008).
' JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND
REDRESS 25 (2d ed. 2008) (summarizing criticisms). A leading scholar of
sympathy and emotion in the law offers a moderate version of the criticism,
arguing that it would be imprudent for policymakers to increase the presence
of sympathy currently manifest in American adjudication. Neal R. Feigenson,
Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REV.
1 (1997) [hereinafter Feigenson, Sympathy].
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decide personal-injury cases,6 and so to these critics, the
problem of the lay factfinder who undermines law through
sympathy removes American litigation from the rule of law as
legal systems around the world understand it.
The classic sympathy-trope associated with American
personal injury law features what looks like an innocent victim.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical young plaintiff who
accuses an obstetrician of negligence during his delivery, three
years earlier. The plaintiff suffers from physical and mental
disabilities that his lawyers attribute to misfeasance by the
obstetrician. A trial commences. Expert witnesses testifying for
the defendant find no breach of the pertinent standard of care.
Opposing experts disagree. The judge decides to deny defense
motions for judgment as a matter of law, and sends the case to a
jury; she thinks the question of negligence is close. The three-
year-old is adorable, let us say, and his plight heart-rending. To
tort critics this plaintiff holds an unfair advantage: he will draw
on sympathy.7
From another comer of legal commentary about American
personal injury law, writers have decried a very different
sympathy problem. They perceive a disregard for emotion,
noting that tort law applies its remedial energies much less to
psychological injury than to physical harm.' Tort doctrine
privileges injury that can be expressed in quantified dollar terms
over what it calls non-economic loss, and often will, by statute,
6 Geoffrey Palmer, Accident Compensation in New Zealand: Looking
Back and Looking Forward, 2008 N.Z. L. REv. 81, 87 (2008) (noting this
American anomaly).
See James Phelan, Note, Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez: The Texas
Supreme Court Broadens the Class of Impermissible Commitment Questions
in Civil Voir Dire, 59 BAYLOR L. REv. 541, 544 (2007) (discussing a similar
hypothetical). On the sympathy-trope for this type of injury, see Anita
Bernstein, Enhancing Drug Effectiveness and Efficacy Through Personal
Injury Litigation, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 1051, 1098 (2007).
' Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort
Law, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 463, 491-500 (1998); Mark Geistfield, Negligence,
Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 585, 608-10
(2003).
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cap the latter category of damages. By contrast, almost every
United States jurisdiction puts no upper limit on what plaintiffs
can recover for pecuniary losses.'l Identifying themselves overtly
with feminism, some writers have suggested that this disregard
for distress and pain amounts to disparagement for what looks
female, a nonpecuniary realm of women." For them, tort law
does indeed have a problem with emotion: the problem is not an
excess of unruly sympathy, as the tort reformers have charged,
but a refusal to honor the reality of feeling. 2
Although the criticisms of American personal injury law
appear opposed, they hold ground in common. This Article,
finding validity in both the concern about too much sympathy
from the first group of critics and the protests of the second
group, replaces "sympathy" with a wider Enlightenment
construct from 1754. Adam Smith, starting his Theory of Moral
Sentiments with this word, 3 went on to describe a more complex
phenomenon and gave it its own term. His coinage, "fellow-
feeling," includes what an exegesis on Smith today would call
sympathy and also empathy, interconnectedness of feeling, and
identification with another person.
9 Joseph Sanders, Reforming General Damages: A Good Tort Reform, 13
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 115, 129-40 (2008) (reviewing state provisions
to cap damages and empirical findings about their effects).
'0 One exception is Virginia. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (2006)
(capping pecuniary as well as non-pecuniary damages).
" Chamallas, supra note 8 at 498; F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and
Impact of the "Tort Reform" Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 452
(2006) (summarizing this literature).
12 Although academic feminists have been a dominant cohort among
those who favor more regard for emotion in personal injury law, they are not
the only such advocates. In his student days, for example, one Torts scholar
recommended that sympathy play a stronger role in tort adjudication.
Benjamin Zipursky, DeShaney and the Jurisprudence of Compassion, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101 (1990). On empathy as a volatile subject within
American law and politics, see James Carroll, In Search of Empathy, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 17, 2009, at Editorial, p. 11 (discussing the concept with
relation to decisions of the Obama administration, particularly the
appointment of Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court).
13 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 10 (D.D. Raphael
& A.L. MacFie eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1759).
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If fellow-feeling is present in personal injury law, for whom
does it feel? Many hypotheses deserve investigation. This
Article, asking "the woman question,' 4 chooses only one. It
starts with the uncontroversial premise that when tort law took
form in the United States, it privileged men and imposed
adversity on women. A quick summary: Until the late nineteenth
century, American women could not hold personal property in
their own name; this legal disability prevented them from suing
and being sued. Women could not represent personal-injury
litigants as advocates in court. They could not serve as judges;
they were barred from juries. As far as we know, a woman in
the United States or Britain never tried to emulate Thomas
Cooley, Frederick Pollock, Francis Hilliard, or Charles
Greenstreet Addison by publishing a nineteenth-century
monograph on torts;' 5 it is hard to suppose that she could have
found a publisher. In short, women had almost no voice and no
power in the early formation of American tort law. Today,
though no longer barred from participation, women remain
significantly underrepresented among the groups and individuals
empowered to form tort doctrine.1 6 If fellow-feeling is a force in
American personal injury law, then one might expect it to
function as do other forces in this field: to the exclusion or
14 Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV.
829, 837-49 (1990).
" CHARLES G. ADDISON, WRONGS AND THEIR REMEDIES: A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF TORTS (BANKS AND BROS.) (1860); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE
INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT (CALLAGHAN & CO. 1880); FRANCIS HILLIARD,
THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS (LITTLE, BROWN, & Co.) (1859);
FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES
OF OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM CIVIL WRONGS IN THE COMMON LAW
(BANKS & BROS.) (1898).
16 On the underrepresentation of women within these groups-judges,
personal-injury litigators, legislators, and scholars-see KATHARINE T.
BARTLETT & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE,
COMMENTARY 682-90 (4th ed. 2006) (summarizing statistical data about
disparities); for another statistic, see Susan Faludi, Second Place Citizens,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2008 at A19 (observing that the percentage of women
in state legislatures has stagnated in the low 20s for the last fifteen years).
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detriment of women and to the benefit of men.
This favoritism reveals a distinction between sympathy, as
tort reformers have used the term, and fellow-feeling. Sympathy
and pity defeat impartiality and the rule of law when a pathetic
plaintiff vanquishes a strong defendant." Yet feelings of
connection and identification surely extend beyond the tiny
number of lucky, well-counseled, winsomely injured people who
win big and inspire tort reform campaigns. Other people can
attain them too. Witnesses, defendants, co-defendants, lawyers,
and even (or so I will argue) business entities and their
managers are all potential recipients of this feeling. Enlarge
sympathy to include the breadth of fellow-feeling, and these
others stand to receive much from the civil justice system. If
personal injury law has been shaped-or, to put the point more
tendentiously, if the objective content of tort law has been
undone-by fellow-feeling, then the effects of this influence
probably go beyond inflated verdicts. The powerful too are
eligible to enjoy its emollients.
Our earlier hypothetical case, Disabled Child v. Obstetrician,
might cause an observer to worry that unruly emotion would
cause a jury to deem the defendant at fault when he was not,
and if the defendant was indeed at fault, to overcompensate the
plaintiff.'8 Good malpractice-defense lawyers, however, once
they and their clients have chosen to go to trial rather than
settle, refuse to be daunted by this worry. They do not cede
fellow-feeling to their adversaries. To the extent they can, they
will not only call their neutral-sounding emotion-free experts to
talk about the standard of care, but also portray their client
7 For a survey of emotion as a force that sways juries in favor of
plaintiffs and against defendants-the standard conception of emotion in
personal injury law that this Article seeks to supplement-see NEIL
FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT
ACCIDENTS 69-86 (2000).
18 Adam Smith was aware of the unique claim that a child makes on
sympathetic engagement. See SMITH, supra note 13, at 219 (observing that a
child "excites a much more lively as well as a much more universal
sympathy" than an old man: "Every thing may be expected, or at least
hoped, from the child. In ordinary cases, very little can be either expected or
hoped from the old man.").
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sympathetically, as a valiant Everyman who fought long odds to
help the unborn, now ungrateful, plaintiff and his laboring
mother. 19
That could be me, fellow-feeling concludes, and often to the
detriment of weaker parties. Juries side with physicians much
more than patients.2 ° Judge-made shifts in doctrine have gone in
the same direction: a plaintiff prosecuting a medical malpractice
claim typically has to demonstrate its merit before it will go to a
jury, and clear other hurdles.2' Medical-malpractice statutory
reforms favoring defendants originated more in manipulation
than data.22 Emotion-based and non-analytical affinities, in short,
have aided not only vulnerable accusers but the individuals and
entities they accuse.
In considering whether fellow-feeling helps men in the realm
of personal injury, this Article regards products liability as a
rich venue for investigation, because gender in the United States
has been especially central to the phenomenon of claiming and
receiving compensation for injuries ascribed to defective
products.23 Women have reported to the courts that numerous
'9 Berkeley Rich, Malpractice: How to Neutralize the Sympathy Factor,
MEDICAL ECONOMICS, Feb. 20, 2004, at 81 (offering a more detailed version
of this strategy).
20 Numerous studies report the same conclusion; the divergences are
limited to how much the defense win rate exceeds 50%. Ralph Peeples &
Catherine T. Harris, Learning to Crawl: The Use of Voluntary Caps on
Damages in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 708
n.33 (2005) (citing an array of surveys that showed physicians prevailing in
58%, 67%, 75%, 78%, and 87% of jury trials).
21 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 53A-27 (West 2004) (requiring
plaintiffs to file an expert affidavit that a malpractice claim has merit); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60B (2006) (requiring malpractice claims to go
through expert panels before trial).
22 STEPHANIE MENCIMER, BLOCKING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR 182-95
(2006) (recounting staged protests by doctors, industry lobbying, and
distorted data); Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice 'Crisis': Recent
Trends and the Impact of State of Tort Reforms, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 21,
2004, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org.
23 Hoping to sidestep controversies in this area-on whether gender is
binary, for example, or the functions of this category, see Jennifer M.
Protas, Comment, Divesting from "The Apartheid of the Closet": Toward an
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manufactured objects caused them injury in gender-specific
manifestations.24 In a separate cluster of actions, plaintiffs have
accused manufacturers of in effect using the placenta as a
conduit to poison embryos and fetuses.25 Other female plaintiffs
fall in a disparate impact category: women happened to
encounter a particular dangerous product much more than men."
One injurious item that inflicted most of its damage on
workers who encountered it in places and times that excluded
women-shipyards, railroads, construction sites, mines, and
insulation factories during the middle of the twentieth century-
becomes, against this backdrop, an anomaly in products liability.
The anomaly is not that men filed products liability actions
attacking the toxic substance that will occupy this Article. Their
gender has dominated case law assailing many things as
defective: ladders, power tools, punch presses, tractors,
automobiles. What makes asbestos litigation unusual is that it
located toxicity, rather than the collateral damage that an
industrial economy always wreaks,27 in something that was
"made for men" (as holders of the pertinent near-monopolies in
employment) "to use or take." 21 Of all the products that have
Enriched Legal Discourse of Sexual and Gender Identity, 38 McGEORGE L.
REV. 571, 577-80 (2007)-I refer here to gender as onlookers perceive it.
24 The gynecological injury category includes (and is not limited to)
DES, breast implants, tampons, the Dalkon Shield, and other contraceptives.
In another set of cases, women allege other types of injuries as a result of
their encounters with women-only products: for example, strokes from anti-
lactation drugs. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
25 See generally Anita Bernstein, Formed by Thalidomide: Mass Torts as
a False Cure for Toxic Exposure, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2153, 2156 (1997)
(summarizing litigation over thalidomide and Bendectin, which alleged that
these drugs were teratogenic).
26 See infra notes 262-64, 297-304 and accompanying text (describing
fen-phen litigation).
2 See generally John Fabian Witt, Speedy Fred Taylor and the Ironies of
Enterprise Liability, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 14-21 (2003) (exploring the rise
of "industrial accident" as a concept in the late nineteenth century).
" Joan E. Steinman, A Legal Sampler: Women, Medical Care, and Mass
Tort Litigation, 68 Cm. KENT L. REV. 409, 411 (1992). Steinman's 1992
article found no product that fit this bill. Some years later, the Sixth Circuit
issued In re American Medical Systems, Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996),
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achieved notoriety in the annals of American liability only one,
Agent Orange, is as strongly associated as asbestos with harm to
men's bodies. Asbestos litigation exemplifies male-gendered
products liability.
It has been easy to lose sight of both gender and fellow-
feeling in asbestos liability, however, because of the stupefying
amount of money already transferred-with billions more dollars
certain to be spent. In monetary-liability terms, all the products
adjudicated as toxic to women, aggregated together, are less
significant than asbestos.2 9 Asbestos liability looks like the
opposite of emotion. Move along: nothing to see here but
money, actuarial projection, and business insolvency.
The contrary possibility explored in this Article is that the
biggest injurer of men known to American products liability law
marked a triumph of fellow-feeling, rooted in identification with
and sympathy for men qua men, over cold hard doctrine. The
doctrinal severities that all plaintiffs in principle must overcome
are summarized in Part I, to set the baseline. Gaps between
asbestos victories on one hand, and the harsher applications that
govern most products liability actions on the other, look like
what tort reform critics (who have been remarkably gentle in
their comments on asbestos liability)30 denounce when they
decertifying a class of plaintiffs who alleged injury from a penile implant.
The court accepted the named plaintiff's estimate that the class numbered
between 15,000 to 120,000 persons. Id. at 1079-80.
29 Researchers have estimated that by 2002 asbestos liability had
amounted to more than $70 billion and had driven more than 75 corporations
into bankruptcy; they anticipate that between 2002 and the end of liability,
perhaps fifty years hence, another sum between $130 billion and $195 billion
would join the current $70 billion expended. This liability has spread its
effects far beyond the dozens of bankrupted businesses, causing secondary
losses to the economy amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars. STEPHEN
J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION 92-97, 121-23 (2005) [hereinafter
RAND REPORT].
30 David E. Bernstein, Keeping Junk Science Out of Asbestos Litigation,
31 PEPP. L. REV. 11 (2003) (hereinafter Bernstein, Junk Science) (focusing
on only two narrow, discrete "junk science" dangers); Steven B. Hantler et
al., Is the "Crisis" in the Civil Justice System Real or Imagined?, 38 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1151-52 (2005) (confining criticisms of asbestos liability
to the inclusion of peripheral defendants). In his polemic against "junk
303
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denounce sympathy. Part II explores fellow-feeling as a source
of compassionate identification.
The sympathizers under study in this Article are not the lay
factfinders that have worried tort-reform critics, but men
empowered to interpret and apply the law. Judges released
asbestos plaintiffs from many demands of personal injury
doctrine. Parts III and IV contrast what groups of claimants
received when they made allegations about their encounters with
dangerous products. When judging asbestos claims, courts
waved away rules that hobbled complainants, wrote spontaneous
pro-plaintiff revisions to existing doctrine, interpreted statutory
law to maximize opportunities to bring actions, and gave
plaintiffs the benefit of considerable factual doubt. Part IV,
reviewing contrary outcomes in personal injury actions that
women brought, finds evidence that judges greeted male litigants
with an unusually warm welcome.
The record is not one of simple unequal treatment in court,
where men fare well and women poorly. This Article, focused
on feeling, seeks the emotional constituents of American
personal injury law. Part IV examines two emotions that human
beings (and perhaps other primates)31 feel in reaction to the
manifestations of hurt that they perceive. One such response is
the desire to comfort. Personal injury law sometimes honors
plaintiffs as human beings who crave and deserve emotional
succor. Defying a larger doctrinal stance against recognition of
emotional injury (which has long kept female-dominated groups
of plaintiffs uncompensated), courts permit asbestos plaintiffs to
recover for their emotional distress. Courts also have ordered
asbestos defendants to pay for medical monitoring, a remedy
that gives plaintiffs non-pecuniary support and care, which tort
law typically withholds. The second emotional reaction observed
is outrage, which emerges in the form of blame. Courts have
science," which he sees as having warped American liability in a plaintiff-
favoring direction, Peter Huber has kind words for asbestos liability, saying
that "good science" underlies claims for the "great harm" it caused. PETER
W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 152
(1991).
31 See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
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sheltered asbestos plaintiffs from blame and responsibility for
their own harm. This protection contrasts with the way they
have blamed women-especially sexually active women and
mothers of children harmed by defective products-who had the
temerity to assert claims for redress.
Readers who accept this descriptive thesis-that gendered
fellow-feeling influences outcomes in American personal injury
law-might well conclude that this condition does not call for
any reform or other normative response. The only shift I
explicitly recommend here comes from Adam Smith himself, the
first thinker to contemplate the moral demands of fellow-feeling.
Smith urged readers of The Theory of Moral Sentiments to "feel
much for others and little for ourselves," and "to restrain our
selfish, and to indulge our benevolent, affections."32 An increase
in both benevolent affections and regard for the welfare of
others would enhance personal injury law too.
I. DOCTRINES THAT BURDEN PERSONAL-INJURY PLAINTIFFS
CATEGORICALLY
Rules of evidence and civil procedure decree that plaintiffs
always must lose-even if a jury or other factfinder would find
what happened to them worthy of redress-unless they can
overcome a set of hurdles. It is these constraints on plaintiffs'
opportunities that give personal injury litigation, a notoriously
statute and rule-free area of the law,33 much of the scant
doctrinal content it holds. While tort law will sometimes
recognize specific common-law doctrines that give plaintiffs a
boost, 4 its broadest and most universally applicable precepts
32 SMITH, supra note 13, at 25.
3 OUVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 88-89 (Mark
DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881) (observing that "a
vague test" governs the analysis of negligence); Caroline Forell, Statutes and
Torts: Comparing the United States to Australia, Canada, and England, 36
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 865 (2000) (describing the dominance of judge-made
law in tort adjudication).
34 Among the pro-plaintiff boosts are res ipsa loquitur, alternative
liability, and the collateral source rule.
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amount to limits on the prerogative of an injured party to haul a
putative wrongdoer before lay strangers and plead for
recompense.
A. The Preponderance of the Evidence Standard
Tort law holds personal-injury claimants to a "more probable
than not," or preponderance, standard of proof whereby they
must establish that the existence of contested facts is more
probable than its nonexistence." This preponderance standard is
conventionally regarded as low and easy to meet when compared
to the other two standards of proof commonly used in American
adjudication.16 Judicial opinions that advert to the preponderance
standard frequently modify it with the adjective "mere.""
This lowest of the three standards of proof will indeed be
"mere" much of the time-but not when disputed facts approach
equipoise, or very close parity. Whenever the plaintiffs and
defendant's stances are in equipoise, the preponderance standard
calls for absolute and permanent rejection of a claim: "the
plaintiff loses and cannot relitigate the case."3" This rigid,
categorical interpretation looks like a quasi-scientific rule but in
fact diverges from scientific practice: whenever an experiment
yields an outcome that is not consistent with a null hypothesis,
but also does not meet conventional standards for significance,
the protocol for a researcher is to continue investigating, not to
" JOHN WILLIAM STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339 (5th ed.
1999).
36 The other standards are "beyond a reasonable doubt," to sustain a
conviction where a defendant has pleaded not guilty, and "clear and
convincing evidence," applied in a range of miscellaneous proceedings where
"the interests at stake .. .are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss
of money." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
17 Nat'l Org. of Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646, 662-63
(D.C. Cir. 1994); Marshak v. Treadwell, 58 F. Supp. 2d 551, 566 (D. N.J.
1999); In re Estate of Walker, 890 A.2d 216, 228 n.ll (D.C. App. 2006).
38 Neil B. Cohen, The Gatekeeping Role in Civil Litigation and the
Abdication of Legal Values in Favor of Scientific Values, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 943, 955 (2003).
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dismiss the hypothesis.3 9 Cases in equipoise fall into a similar
middle ground. Liability law dispatches them in a way that
sensible, open-minded inquiry would not.
B. Proof of Causation
Personal injury doctrine compels plaintiffs to prove that the
conduct they identify as tortious caused the harm they
experienced. In some of the costlier comers of this field-
products liability, medical malpractice, toxic torts-their effort
needs expert evidence, often of a scientific or specialized nature.
Courts enforce the evidentiary burden with rules like the almost-
universal requirement that medical malpractice claims cannot
reach a jury without expert testimony on the standard of care4O
and the obligation of plaintiffs to produce a reasonable
alternative to the design of any product they challenge as
defective. 4' Even when doctrine does not categorically force
plaintiffs to come up with arcane evidence of causation, in
practice summary judgment functions to defeat contentions that
42
cannot thus be supported.
State and federal rules of evidence long maintained a formal
hurdle for plaintiffs by holding them to a general-acceptance
standard of admissibility for the testimony they sought to
introduce. Articulated without much exposition in a 1923 federal
case, Frye v. United States,43 the general-acceptance standard
forced judges to reject any proffered expert testimony around
which the relevant scientific community had not united. This
criterion amounted to another hurdle for personal-injury
plaintiffs, who had to deal regularly with uncertainty on the
causal connection between acts or choices of defendants and the
39 Id. at 995.
40 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 642 (2000).
41 RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998).
42 Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial
Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation
Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 335, 339 (1999).
43 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (keeping a
precursor of polygraph technology from the jury in a criminal trial).
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harms they suffered. Frye's conservative, static approach to
expert knowledge provoked grumbling and occasional resistance
from judges and critics who thought that it set "an artificially
high threshold."" General acceptance nevertheless remained the
rule in most states and the federal courts, and Frye perseveres in
a few states today.45
In 1993, the Supreme Court reinterpreted Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence to repudiate the Frye rule of general
acceptance while also holding that trial judges must keep expert
scientific evidence from juries unless they deem that evidence
valid.46  Commentary on Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals has agreed that despite the permissive tenor of
the holding (i.e. many criteria for admissibility with no relative
weight attached to each, rather than the unitary criterion of Frye
and the liberal pedigree of Justice Blackmun himself), Daubert
continues to restrict plaintiffs' personal injury claims.47
Especially after General Electric Co. v. Joiner,48 holding that
trial courts enjoy latitude to apply the Daubert criteria to
litigants as they see fit, judges gained a prerogative to look with
deep skepticism at any new assertion that some antecedent
caused an effect. Personal-injury claims involving prescription
drugs post-Daubert have had to reckon with this judicial
skepticism: A plaintiff might possess good evidence about the
dangerousness of a drug and some evidence about the causal
4 Stan Kitzinger, Note, The Supreme Court Waves Good-bye to Frye:
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 58 ALB. L. REV. 575, 581
(1994).
4' Archie Alexander, Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Lie
Detection: Is a "Brainstorm" Heading Toward the "Gatekeeper"?, 7 Hous. J.
HEALTH POL'Y & L. 1, 25-26 (2006).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89, 592-93
(1993).
4' Anita Bernstein, Products Liability in the United States Supreme
Court: A Venture in Memory of Gary Schwartz, 53 S.C. L. REv. 1193, 1216-
17 (2002) (reviewing cases and commentary); Edward K. Cheng & Albert H.
Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility
Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 472-73 (2005); Lisa Heinzerling, Doubting
Daubert, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 65, 68 (2006).
48 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143, 146 (1997).
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mechanism that hurt her-and, of course, an injury-yet not
reach a jury because of the trial judge's doubts regarding
causation.
The Daubert test determines admissible evidence, not what
would constitute sufficient evidence to support a judgment.
Lower courts, however, have read its admissibility rule to hold
plaintiffs' experts to a sufficiency standard . In other words, a
plaintiff loses before trial not because his proffered evidence is
bad, but because a trial judge thinks it is not enough. Many
judges will privilege epidemiology whenever epidemiology
suggests doubts about causation, for example, even when other
fields of scientific inquiry could support a causal hypothesis, and
thus exclude as irrelevant "other types of scientific evidence,
such as animal studies, toxicology reports, chemical structure
analysis, and clinical differential diagnosis."5 °
In sum, Daubert installed new barriers to recovery.51 The
older Frye barriers, still present in United States jurisdictions,
were equally formidable. Under either approach to expert
evidence, plaintiffs rather than defendants bear the costs of
uncertainty.
C. Narrow Conceptions of Injury
The most fundamental element of a tort cause of action is
harm of a kind that courts choose to recognize. Plaintiffs need
invasion of a protected interest in order to prosecute their claim.
Notwithstanding folklore to the effect that in the United States
'9 Finley, supra note 42, at 348; Brief of Margaret A. Berger & Jerome
P. Kassirer as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at 21-29, Rider
v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 61-11965 BB
and 01-CC).
o Finley, supra note 42, at 350.
"' Bernstein, supra note 47, at 1216-17 (describing the transition of
Daubert from permissive to restrictive).
5' See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due
Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J.
524, 600-01 (2005).
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any person can sue anyone for anything,53 attempts to seek
redress for harm are routinely flushed from the docket for lack
of a cognizable injury. Both Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and state-level laws pertaining to demurrer
require judges to dismiss any complaint that fails to state a cause
of action .
The 12(b) or demurrer hurdle usually functions to defeat
actions that depend on conceptions of duty that courts find too
expansive, but it does not require a judge to reach any particular
conclusion on the question of duty. In both form and effect, it
just tells plaintiffs that a judge does not favor their claim. An
illustrative example comes from the walk that a Boston laborer
took in 1872 to visit his boss, planning to ask whether he might
change his work time from night to day. After becoming injured
on the highway and suing the city, the laborer had his claim
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action because he had
been traveling on Sunday, "and not for any work of necessity or
charity."55 Connolly v. City of Boston did not rest on an
affirmative defense or any other showing by the defendant. The
plaintiff started to tell the story of his injury and the trial judge
simply interrupted him, saying it was no injury at all as far as
the Commonwealth was concerned, and the Supreme Judicial
Court agreed.
56
Today, although those who travel on any day without regard
to "any work of necessity or charity" may bring actions when
5" See Marshall B. Kapp, The Lost Art of Drawing the Line, FLA. BAR
J., Oct. 2001, at 64 ("In the name of promoting our right to sue anybody for
anything at any time, we have been transformed into a nation of potential
defendants constantly looking nervously over our shoulders. This is hardly
freedom."); Hold Down Awards to Ease the Crisis, USA TODAY, Jun. 6,
1986, at 12A. For a contention that just the opposite is true-that American
cultural norms suppress some of the personal-injury claims that would
otherwise be filed-see Shawn J. Bayern, Comment, Explaining the American
Norm Against Litigation, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1697, 1697-1704 (2005).
'4 See Failure to State a Claim, in 4 WEST's ENCYC. OF AM. LAw 300
(2d ed. 2004), available at http://www.answers.con/topic/failure-to-state-a-
claim (last visited July 29, 2009).
15 Connolly v. City of Boston, 117 Mass. 64, 64 (1875).
56 Id. at 64-65.
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they get hurt during their trip, all personal-injury plaintiffs still
must meet judicial criteria for cognizable harm. Recurring
categories of injury collide with this barrier. To be taken
seriously in tort courts, the harms that plaintiffs allege must
typically be "physical, visible, or discernible."17 Courts tend to
classify "psychic injuries, injuries to mental or emotional
equilibrium, and probabilistic injuries, lost chances, or increased
risks" as less worthy of serious attention.58 For the less favored
"ethereal torts," redress for injury depends on a sometimes
withheld recognition that what the plaintiff suffered was both
genuine and actionable.5 9
D. Limitation Periods
Invoked as an affirmative defense, a state statute of
limitation will destroy an otherwise unassailable claim for
personal injury-on the ground that the plaintiff has filed the
action too late. Statutes of limitation have coexisted with
common-law claims for more than five hundred years. 60 They
protect defendants from baleful accompaniments to personal
injury litigation: dilatory tactics, aging memories, deteriorating
physical evidence. In function, they privilege one entitlement
over another: As the United States Supreme Court has declared,
"the right to be free of stale claims" will, after a legislatively
established period of time has lapsed, come "to prevail over the
right to prosecute them."
6
'
This venerable "right to be free of stale claims" rested on
sounder ground during its early sixteenth-century origins than it
does today.62 Modern factfinding has reduced its dependency on
" Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 136, 174
(1992).
58 Id.
59 id.
60 HENRY THOMAS BANNING & ARCHIBALD BROWN, THE LAW OF THE
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 1-2 (3d ed. 1906).
61 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342,
349 (1944).
62 See Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitation in Toxic
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the frail mind or body of an individual human being. A large
proportion of personal-injury defendants are now entities that
enjoy perpetual existence and can retain their business records
indefinitely. Technologies for preservation and storage keep
alive contentions that depend on witness testimony (recordings
of which can be stored redundantly and cheaply) or the physical
identification of anything individual, such as human DNA. Even
more dramatic than these shifts has been the rise of latent injury,
unknown when limitation periods arose in early modem England
and today extraordinarily costly in the United States. If exposure
to a substance causes physical injury only after several years
have elapsed, statutes of limitation impose a perverse roadblock:
The quality of evidence needed to decide claims has improved
rather than deteriorated.63
The right to be free of stale claims has come to outweigh the
right to prosecute them. One innovation present in both state
statutes and decisional law, "the discovery rule," does
occasionally give plaintiffs the benefit of a longer limitation
period: claims that would otherwise accrue at a particular time
of impact can accrue instead at a later point, the time that
plaintiffs reasonably should have known of the relevant facts. 6
But technologies that commend the extension (if not the
abandonment) of limitation deadlines have not generally had this
liberal effect for plaintiffs. Instead, the tort-reform era, a
technologically fecund time, saw the enactment of statutes of
repose, which gave defendants immunity from responsibility for
the harms of certain manufactured products; 65 and many states
chose to shorten rather than lengthen or eliminate their personal-
injury limitation periods. 66
Substances Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 965, 971, 1012-14 (1988)
(recommending a partial abolition).
6' An asbestos action brought forth this judicial insight. Wilson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See also Green,
supra note 62 at 969 (noting "the paradox").
64 DOBBS, supra note 40, at 556. See also infra Part 11.B.2.
65 DOBBS, supra note 40, at 557-58.
66 PATRICIA M. DANZON, NEW EVIDENCE ON THE FREQUENCY AND
SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS vii (1986) (finding that these
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E. Summary: A Message to Plaintiffs about the Likely Merits
of Their Personal Injury Claims
These doctrines, among others, convey and enforce
skepticism toward what plaintiffs allege. The law says to
plaintiffs:
Unless you can prove that your version of the story is
more likely than the defendant's version, you-and not
your adversary, who might be just as unable to meet that
burden-will lose. Unless what you regard as an injury
comports with judges' conceptions of what an injury is,
you will lose.
You must prove not only tortious conduct (or the
existence of a product defect) and harm to yourself, but a
causal connection between the two, and if scientific or
other complex evidence is necessary to show the
connection, you must obtain this evidence-even iffinding
it is extremely costly, or if the current state of knowledge
contains no answers to critical questions-or you will
lose. Should you obtain valid evidence on the causation
of a toxic or pharmaceutical injury, you may nevertheless
lose if you do not meet a judge's beliefs about what
epidemiology demands.
And if you do not wish to lose, even if your claim is
flawless, you had better file before your statutory
deadline passes. Courts will not accept an excuse for
your lateness.
Postures like these, especially when taken together, send a
message of presumptive disapproval. In order to recover for the
harm they have identified, personal-injury plaintiffs have to push
through a hard surface. The remainder of this Article explores
fissures and soft spots in this surface of judicial rejection. While
categorical rules discourage individuals from bringing tort
shortenings reduced the number of claims filed); Katharine F. Nelson, The
1990 Federal "Fallback" Statute of Limitations: Limitations by Default, 72
NEB. L. REv. 454, 508 (1993) (identifying a national trend toward shorter
statutes of limitations for personal injury).
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actions, episodes of gentleness make some of these persons
welcome in court, and extend them relief. The next Parts offer
examples of warmth in the otherwise cold climate of personal
injury law. Women have occasionally benefited from this
warmth, but strikingly it has favored men.
IH. FELLOW-FEELING AS A CONSTITUENT OF PERSONAL INJURY
LIABILITY
A. What is Fellow-Feeling?
The philosopher and economist Adam Smith began his
Theory of Moral Sentiments by observing that every man, no
matter how "selfish" he may be, has "some principles in his
nature" that "interest him in the fortune of others, and render
their happiness necessary to him. ,67 Expounding on this thesis,
Smith offered an illustration. Imagine a man before our own
eyes. He is being tortured. We are not. We respond, even
though "as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will
never inform us of what he suffers." 61 While "our brother is
upon the rack," 69 we share in his experience, even though we
stand at a distance from it:
By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation,
we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments,
we enter as it were into his body, and become in some
measure the same person with him, and thence form
some idea of his sensations, and even feel something
which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike
them. His agonies, when they are thus brought home to
ourselves, when we have thus adopted and made them
our own, begin at last to affect us, and we then tremble
and shudder at the thought of what he feels.70
A modem speaker of English would call this inclination
67 SMITH, supra note 13, at 9.
8 Id.
69 id.
70 id.
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sympathy, as Smith did,7 or perhaps empathy. Yet because
sympathy and empathy are not exact synonyms, neither term
conveys the full emotional content of Smith's illustration.72
Sympathy connotes caring, loyalty, affection, or an inclination to
support somebody or something. Empathy, which refers to the
understanding of another person's inclinations or feelings, can
exist even if the person bearing empathy has no desire to benefit
the object of this understanding.
Smith offers a second illustration in this chapter, "On
Sympathy," that comports more with empathy:
When we see a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon
the leg or arm of another person, we naturally shrink and
draw back our own leg or our own arm; and when it
does fall, we feel it in some measure, and are hurt by it
as well as the sufferer.73
Because neither sympathy nor empathy conveys what an
onlooker would in all cases feel when watching a "brother on
the rack," or the blow about to land on another person's leg or
arm, the phenomenon that includes "interdependencies of
feeling" needs its own descriptive label. 74 "Empathy" includes
the identification with ourselves-"our own leg"-but omits the
emotion often simultaneously present. 75 "Sympathy" recognizes
that the pain conveyed by imagination resembles pain conveyed
by a truncheon, but it also implies an affective state inside the
onlooker that may not be there. When we watch a man being
71 See, e.g., id. (Chapter 1, "On Sympathy").
72 On overlaps between the two, discussed with reference to Smith, see
Feigenson, Sympathy, supra note 5, at 11-12.
73 SMITH, supra note 13, at 10.
74 Robert Sugden, Beyond Sympathy and Empathy: Adam Smith's
Concept of Fellow-Feeling, 18 ECON. & PHIL. 63, 71 (2002).
7' For examples of how empathy can be present without sympathy, see
Zack Berman, Thorns Learns, and Blossoms, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2009, at
E4 (reporting that a college athlete received empathy but not sympathy from
his father and uncle); Dimitri K. Simes & Paul J. Saunders, Putin's Russia:
Dangers Increase for Democracy, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 9, 2000, at
G1 (advocating empathy but not sympathy for Russia with respect to
Chechnya).
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tortured, and feel what Adam Smith says we feel-when we
"enter as it were into his body"-we also, for our own reasons,
might conclude that the torture should continue. To locate the
partial overlap of sympathy and empathy necessary for this
descriptive purpose, and to supply what each word lacks, Smith
coined the term "fellow-feeling. 76
Fellow-feeling has defining attributes. At least four of them
pertain to personal-injury law as enforced and applied in the
United States. First, at the individual level, the attentions of
fellow-feeling are unitary. Individuals experience fellow feeling
for only one object-typically, for only one person-at a time.
In Smith's illustrations, a torturer is present, inflicting pain
intentionally on "our brother on the rack," and when "we see a
stroke aimed as just ready to fall" on someone's arm or leg, we
also see the person who aims the stroke. But these other people
do not qualify for our fellow-feeling. Indeed, Smith uses the
passive voice to eliminate the stroke-aimer from our
consideration.
Second, for the most part fellow-feeling (its presence in the
first pages of a book called The Theory of Moral Sentiments
notwithstanding) is a psychological state rather than a moral
conclusion." Watching a rack twist our brother's body, or blows
rain down on another person, we might respond at a moral
level: on how we ought to feel, whom we should condemn, what
reactive measures we ought to take. But that reflection is not
necessarily present when we experience fellow-feeling. The
sensation of fellow-feeling comes upon a human being almost
involuntarily. 78 This distance from a sense of duty, loyalty, or
affection is part of the difference between fellow-feeling and
sympathy.
Third, fellow-feeling as an experience feels good. Its
existence reminds us that not everything we enjoy derives from
strategy or a conscious pursuit. Though unplanned and not
71 Sugden, supra note 74, at 71 (attributing this purpose to Smith).
" See RAPHAEL, supra note 3, at 134 (observing that "the grounding [of
Adam Smith's moral philosophy] is psychological, not logical").
78 See id. at 71-72.
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entirely under our control, fellow-feeling gives us satisfactions
as deep as the pleasure of going after an object of desire and
winning it. The connection feels good even when people so
united are experiencing distress. Adam Smith, describing "the
pleasure of mutual sympathy,"79 noted that this sentiment both
"enlivens joy and alleviates grief. 8 °
This third point may call for an illustration. Suppose that two
individuals, Steve and Eydie, are connected by what we are here
calling fellow-feeling. Something good has happened to Eydie
or, alternatively, something bad has happened to Steve. Start
with the good hypothetical event. Steve will be pleased by the
story of Eydie's recent triumph as soon as she tells him about it.
Speakers of idiomatic contemporary English say they would
"like to share the news" with a group of listeners only when the
news is good: with this phrase, they pass along not only factual
information but the chance of mutually held positive emotion.
When telling Steve, her partner in fellow-feeling, about her own
happiness, Eydie conveys some of that happiness to him while
losing none for herself. Should Steve tell Eydie his own bad
news, he retains the pain he started with, but he suffers less.
The emotional connection in their fellow-feeling-the way her
reactive state corresponds with his condition-gives him
comfort. Mutual sympathy, wrote Smith, "alleviates grief by
insinuating into the heart almost the only agreeable sensation
which it is at that time capable of receiving." 8
The fourth and final attribute of fellow-feeling pertinent to
personal injury law is that although fellow-feeling is primarily
psychological rather than moral, "the psychology of fellow-
feeling and the correspondence of sentiments is tightly linked
with that of approval and disapproval; and approval and
disapproval form the basis of our sense of morality."82 Human
groups teach morality and enforce it. Approval and disapproval
can exist only in aggregations of persons.
'9 SMITH, supra note 13, at 13.
'0 Id. at 14.
I /d.
82 Sugden, supra note 74, at 13.
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This attribute distinguishes fellow-feeling from "sympathy"
and "empathy" by making reference to the social-and, I argue,
from there the political and jurisprudential 3-facets of this
connection. Return to Eydie as she relates her good news to
Steve. Eydie will manifest some emotional affect (even if it is
only a blankness or lack of joy that looks odd to Steve, who
supposes that he would have been more exultant if the good
news had happened to him). Steve might react to Eydie's affect
with one or more of many conclusory adjectives: he might deem
her unaware, gleeful, distracted, ungrateful, too modest, and so
on. Fellow-feeling makes us judgmental even when almost
nothing is at stake. "We are even put out of humour if a
companion laughs louder or longer at a joke than we think it
deserves," Smith observed. 4
Reactions rooted in individuals' judgment go on to form
social categories, and fellow-feeling comes to generate entire
social conceptions of propriety and civic rightness. Individuals
scrutinize and judge their own emotions in reaction to a social
stimulus. They also punish others when their responses to
stimuli appear out of line. We preen to think that we are
popular; we feel pain whenever we appear in our own eyes to
offend or repulse the people we encounter.8 5 Although this
eighteenth-century term does not appear in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, an individual lacking in
manifested fellow-feeling will qualify for a diagnosis of mental
disability 86
3 See infra Part lI.B.4. On the jurisprudential lessons of the Theory of
Moral Sentiments, see RAPHAEL, supra note 3, at 105-14.
SMITH, supra note 13, at 16.
85 Id.
The mental disability of autism is associated with "less complex
emotions, less regulation of emotions and less ability to reflect on one's own
emotion," which deficiencies in turn lead to "difficulties in integrating the
cognitive and affective facets of . . . [another] person's mental states."
Frtdtrique de Vignemont & Uta Frith, Autism, Morality and Empathy, in
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, VOLUME 3: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY:
EMOTION, BRAIN DISORDERS, AND DEVELOPMENT 273, 274 (Walter Sinnot-
Armstrong ed., 2007). The DSM-IV recognizes "asocial personality
disorder," a condition that it occasionally uses interchangeably with
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B. Aspects of Fellow-Feeling that Pertain to Personal Injury
Doctrine
1. For One Side Only (And Businesses Are Eligible)
Every time a court attributes responsibility for a personal
injury, it expresses its conclusion about at least one experience
of reported pain. Injury hurts. American law, taking a capacious
view of these hurts, offers redress for many categories. Its
practitioners use the term "pain and suffering" to describe the
subsets of personal injury that have no precise economic value:
Plaintiffs can receive this recompense for their traumatic
scarring, mental distress, loss of motor function, amputation of
limbs or digits, or discomforts of the type that opiate drugs can
alleviate .87 Defendants found liable in court or who accept
responsibility for an injury through settlement typically add these
payments to more determinate sums like lost wages and medical
expenses. The less-than-pellucid division between "special
damages" (i.e. the fixed or determinate amounts) and "general
damages" (whose value is more subjective) shares this view of
pain and suffering as a distinct portion of what defendants pay to
plaintiffs.
When we move beyond literal nerve endings and post-
traumatic distress, however, pain and suffering becomes more
pervasive, and less distinctly a form of anguish that only
plaintiffs feel. A tort action requires those who participate in
adjudication to price the plaintiff's suffering and, if the plaintiff
succeeds, to compel the defendant to pay this price. Once the
law declares this commensurability of an injury with damages
(or a sum paid in settlement), it becomes axiomatic-or at least
not crazy-to say that whenever a plaintiff prevails, a defendant
experiences pain and suffering. The extended phrase thus could
also describe two types of anguish that do not include trauma or
"psychopathy." See Robert D. Howe, Psychopathy and Antisocial Personality
Disorder: A Case of Diagnostic Confusion, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, (Feb. 1,
1996), available at http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/display/article/10168/
54831?verify=0.
87 DOBBS, supra note 40, at 1050-53.
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nerve endings: the quantifiable part of a plaintiffs damages,
such as medical expenses, and the plight of a defendant who
loses. Personal injury litigation forces factfinders to choose
between inflicting the pain and suffering of rejecting petitions
for redress and the correlative pain and suffering of forcing
defendants to pay. Literal suffering-the hurt that the plaintiff
felt-would appear more compelling than these alternative
constructions of pain. One would expect fellow-feeling to side
with the pitiable.
And yet in practice emotional affinity is not a fatal obstacle
to defense interests, even when defendants are business entities.
Judges and jurors routinely say no to personal-injury plaintiffs. 88
Personal-injury lawyers say no to them too, turning away the
majority of prospective clients who approach them.89 Injured
people themselves say no to their own claims. 9° Medical
malpractice, a source of personal injury for which businesses
pay a large share of damages and settlements, yields far less
than a count of actionable medical errors would predict, 9'
88 See Kevin Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge:
Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124 (1992); Valerie P.
Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors' Treatment of Corporate
Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327 (1998).
89 Julee C. Fischer, Note, Policing the Self-Help Legal Market:
Consumer Protection or Protection of the Legal Cartel?, 34 IND. L. REV.
121, 146 (2000) (reporting that most people who seek counsel following
personal injury are turned down by both private lawyers and legal assistance
programs); Views Given on Health Costs, MORNING CALL, Jul. 19, 2005, at
B1 (reporting an estimate of 80 to 90 percent for medical malpractice
lawyers).
9' A famous law review article lists "naming," or consciousness of one's
own injury as a wrong, as necessary before a prospective plaintiff can move
on to "blaming" and "claiming." William L.F. Felstiner et al., The
Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming,
Claiming ... , 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 631, 636 (1980) ("[Olnly a small
fraction of injurious experiences ever mature into disputes.").
9' The best-known study is PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS:
MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN
NEW YORK, THE REPORT OF THE HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY TO
THE STATE OF NEW YORK at 7-1 (1990) (estimating that only one in eight
patients who suffered actionable negligence sought legal redress). In the mid-
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suggesting that victims might prefer not to embrace the tortious
origin of their harm even if this embrace would hold monetary
value for them.
Rejections, suppressions, and non-assertions of so many
personal-injury claims may seem puzzling. With only warm-
blooded decisionmakers empowered to form and adjudicate a
complaint, how can corporations and other non-human entities
commonly triumph-at every stage of claiming, including the
victim's own consciousness of injury-over hurt human beings?
The belief of lawyers, judges, jurors, and even injured people
themselves that personal-injury plaintiffs frequently should lose,
even when their adversary is not human, bespeaks a consensus
that the defendant in a personal-injury case holds an identity that
includes a moral valence. 92
Even persons who state instrumental reasons for favoring a
defendant rather than a plaintiff ("We don't want to drive it out
of business," "Liability's what makes insurance premiums go
up") necessarily regard this defendant as a distinct entity. Not
all onlookers would agree that the entity holds rights and
entitlements, but these persons do see it as bearing a shape,
existence, and standing. Apparently they believe one should not
hurt even a nexus-of-contracts legal fiction unless one has a
reason for doing so.
This modicum of respect is illustrated by studies about the
way changes in the law seeking to reduce personal-injury
liability have resonated with ordinary individuals who lack
1970s, the California Medical Association undertook a similar investigation
hoping to uncover a high rate of unfounded claiming. Instead, the reviewers
found "levels of injury that stunned the sponsors," and the medical
association "quietly killed the study." Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A.
Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice
Reform, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1595, 1599 (2002). For a return to these findings,
noting that juries continue to favor defendants in medical malpractice actions,
see Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health Courts?, 88 B.U. L. REv. 227, 238-39
(2008).
92 Another possibility, not inconsistent with this attribution of identity to
defendants, is that spectators regard certain plaintiffs as especially unworthy
or distasteful. I take up this possibility below. See supra note 82 and
accompanying text; see also Part IV.B.
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wealth and power. 93 The investigations document the successes
of tort reform initiatives, a victory manifested not only in new
legislation but also through shifts in lay attitudes that have made
personal-injury stories harder to sell to the public. 94 The tort
reform endeavor overcame the notion of businesses as dangerous
and rapacious accretions of wealth by associating their well-
being with core political values: equity, efficiency, security, and
liberty. 9
Disinterested persons would acknowledge the association
between business interests and these "motherhood" values. 96
Consider the values in turn. Equity: Like any other litigant, a
defendant should be treated fairly in court. Efficiency: Wasting
money in adjudication is deplorable. Security and liberty would
be threatened by plaintiffs' verdicts at an aggregate level: a high
enough quantity of liability might make life less safe, if products
and services really do become less available. Also in the liberty
camp: a withdrawal of desired things from markets would
reduce consumer choice. These arguments bring the business
corporation closer to the daily life of a human being by making
it concrete rather than abstract or remote. My options, my
health, my doctors, my kids'playgrounds.
At this point, fellow-feeling moves the Smithian "impartial
spectator" 97 toward siding with the less pathetic litigant.
References to equity, efficiency, security, and liberty link the
" See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Impact That It Has Had Is
Between People's Ears: Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs' Lawyers,
50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453 (2000); Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror
Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to
Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 301, 309 (1998) (reporting data
on jurors' opinions about tort policy).
94 See generally David M. Engel & Michael McCann, Introduction, in
FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE 1, 12 (David M. Engel &
Michael McCann eds., 2009) ("[N]ews coverage has privileged cultural
norms of 'individual responsibility' while ridiculing plaintiffs and, especially,
their attorneys, thus skewing moral and political debate in favor of corporate
producers and to the detriment of consumers.").
9' Daniels & Martin, supra note 93, at 454-55.
Id. at 455 (citing philosopher Deborah Stone).
9' SMITH, supra note 13.
322
FELLOW-FEELING AND GENDER
interests of businesses with the interests of everyone else. The
next step for defendants, more directly rooted in the emotional
content of fellow-feeling, is to alienate the spectator from those
who file personal injury actions. 98
2. The Almost Involuntary Psychological State
Personal injury doctrine makes room for the psychology of
fellow-feeling at several points. Under conventional
understandings of how to adjudicate a negligence claim, each
trial judge divides prerogatives with a jury, in a territorial
power-sharing design.99 Juries are assigned the question of
breach for both negligence and comparative negligence; it is for
them to say whether challenged conduct was "reasonable" or
not. They also align behaviors with outcomes whenever they
decide proximate cause. Judges determine whether the defendant
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. When the facts appear
sufficiently clear to them either before or after trial, they are
empowered to act unilaterally. We have noted their power to
dismiss an action for failure to state a claim: 1° judges also may
rule for one party or another on summary judgment, and enter
judgment for one party notwithstanding a jury verdict.
Fellow-feeling influences all of these domains. When judges
purport to identify their own territory of "law" in contrast to
"facts" for the jury to find, they make claims about fellow-
feeling: they push to the jury the tasks of emotion-sorting they
98 Studies of the personal-injury bar in Texas showed the high profit of
campaigns that portrayed plaintiffs as "golddigging," malingering, and
untrustworthy on the subject of their own pain and suffering. The results are
modest on the surface, having an impact mainly on the humble docket of
automobile-injury cases: jury verdicts come in lower; settlement values drop;
polled jurors decry pain and suffering and applaud personal responsibility.
Not momentous for the bar, except that nonfatal automobile accidents finance
entire practices, paying the bills when bigger cases are either absent or
unremunerative. Several informants told Daniels and Martin that they felt
unable to continue doing personal-injury work. Daniels & Martin, supra note
93, at 472-84.
99 DOBBS, supra note 40, at 33-36.
'0 See supra Part I.C.
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wish to reject for themselves, and when they write and apply
categorical rules, they set up buffers against emotion.'0 ' But their
rules bear the imprint of fellow-feeling too. Even the relatively
rigid doctrines of personal injury law-among them immunities,
negligence per se, and the tiered classifications of land visitors-
have developed with regard to fellow-feeling for one category
of person or another.°2
Jury-territory is more evidently a place for fellow-feeling to
generate results that originate in psychology rather than an
analytic application of major-premise principles. The
reasonableness lens through which juries review claims of
negligence and contributory negligence can generate an ideal-
type competition between the defendant and the plaintiff: the
jury will side with the party holding a better claim to the title.
Folksy descriptions of the reasonable man-the man in the
Clapham omnibus, or the man who takes the magazines at
home, and in his shirtsleeves pushes a mower over his lawn °3-
10 See generally PETER KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS HEAD: JUDGE-MADE
LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1997) (arguing that judges favored
an image of themselves as inclined toward thinking and reasoning rather than
feeling); Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an
Unappreciated History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 606-07 (1993) (describing
judges' views of emotional jurors in the nineteenth century).
'02 A chronological summary captioned "Progressive Tort Law: 1945-
1980" lists numerous judicial landmarks that extended redress to plaintiffs
who once were kept categorically from American courts. Michael H. Rustad
& Thomas L. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil Justice
System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 111-15
(2002). Some of these judge-made changes implicitly evoked sympathy or
empathy. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968)
("A man's life or limb does not become less worthy of protection under the
law because he has come upon the land of another without
permission. . . ."); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782-83 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (announcing a doctrinal shift in focus from the physician to the
patient); see also KARSTEN, supra note 101, at 294 (arguing that surges of
emotion impelled judges to abandon precedents that had disadvantaged hurt
individuals).
103 GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATITUDES AND THE LAW 23
(1985) (citing Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club, [1933] 1 K.B. 205,
224).
FELLOW-FEELING AND GENDER
approve of a juror who will measure a personal-injury litigant
with reference to affinity.'0 Questions of proximate cause invite
jurors to dismiss consequences as freakish, or beyond their own
ken, without having to articulate why the alignment that the
plaintiff has alleged feels wrong to them.
The ascendancy of fellow-feeling over rigid doctrine is not
absolute, and an illustration of the balance between them
emerges in the awarding of damages. Here tort law accepts the
emotion of fellow-feeling while keeping it reined in. Doctrines
like remittitur and additur assert that reason and consistency
must triumph over sympathy. Caps on noneconomic damages
implicitly condemn soft-hearted juries for being inclined to give
away too much money. Trial and appellate judges routinely trim
large compensatory awards as excessive. The Supreme Court
decisions that have given constitutional status to punitive
damages emphasize the evil of unbounded overpunishment. 05
These outcomes are stated in procedural terms, as befits any
discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment; but whenever
punishment is too much, the origins of this excess typically
contain emotion.'0 Mediating between emotional connection to
one party over another on one hand and the impulse to impose
order on the other, personal injury damages manifest both the
psychological inclinations of fellow-feeling and an inclination to
rein these tendencies in.
1o4 See generally Michael Wells, Scientific Policymaking and the Torts
Revolution: The Revenge of the Ordinary Observer, 26 GA. L. REv. 725,
732-33 (1992) (arguing that this homespun imagery makes negligence law out
of the "dominant social expectations of well-socialized persons").
15 See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352-53 (2007);
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).
'06 See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (insisting that the
Constitution requires a death sentence to be "based on reason rather than
caprice or emotion"); Olmstead v. First Interstate Bank of Fargo, N.A., 449
N.W.2d 804, 809 (N.D. 1989) (holding that only "passion or prejudice" can
justify overturning a punitive damages award, and determining that passion
"means the jury was motivated by feelings or emotions rather than the
evidence").
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3. Feeling Good
Fellow-feeling builds a sense of satisfaction for the auditor
or spectator. One economist, reviewing psychological studies
that found tendencies among human infants, family dogs, and
chimpanzees to express sympathy and assuage distress through
gestures, concluded "that for human beings, and at least for
some other social mammals, there is a deep-rooted desire to
receive comfort when distressed and an equally deep-rooted
motivation to engage in comforting behavior in response to other
individuals' distress." °7  Because a personal injury claim
necessarily contains distress on two sides-the plaintiff regards
herself as hurt by wrongful conduct; the defendant resents
having to refute serious accusations at her own expense-both
litigants will crave a comforting, empathetic response from the
factfinder. The factfinder in turn will enjoy the satisfaction of
applying the poultice of favorable disposition.
The factfinder/auditor/ spectator can extract comfort and
satisfaction from either of the binary alternatives that it faces.
Affirming the plaintiff's grievance yields the satisfaction of
having meted out corrective justice. °8 The terminology that
commentators use to describe corrective justice through tort
law-repair, rectification, righting a balance°9-conveys the
easing of distress that extends beyond individually aggrieved
complainants. When the auditor reaches a contrary conclusion,
and sides with a defendant, it hushes the cacophony of a false
107 Robert Sugden, Fellow-Feeling, in ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL
INTERACTION: ACCOUNTING FOR INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 52, 61
(Benedetto Gui and Robert Sugden eds., 2005).
... The literature on corrective justice as applied to tort doctrine generally
associates this type of justice with accepting what a plaintiff contends and
decreeing a just remedy for this person, rather than siding with the defendant.
Outcomes favoring defendants are cast in negative terms: a claim for
corrective justice has proved unavailing.
"9 See generally Rebecca Korzec, Maryland Tort Damages: A Form of
Sex-Based Discrimination, 37 U. BALT. L.F. 97, 110 (2007) ("Corrective
justice seeks to right wrongs by restoring the balance of rights [disrupted by a
wrongdoer]."); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REv. 403,
410-11 (1992) (describing rectification).
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alarm, stirred-up trouble, and the instability that accompanies an
unfounded accusation.
Rituals of jury adjudication encourage participants to find
reassurance in a binary result that Adam Smith, writer of a vivid
binary hypothetical about torture, l° would have recognized. A
judge will thank jurors for their verdict even if it looks shaky,
and praise them. The notion that jury deliberations take place in
a box that no outsider may open or investigate tells these
auditors to settle on affirming one side and disaffirming the
other without equivocation."'
Researchers consistently report that American jurors find
their service gratifying. 2 In 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville
observed that the civil jury trial presented a unique chance for a
citizen to experience justice intimately, in personal terms:
It teaches men to practice equity; every man learns to
judge his neighbor as he would himself be judged ...
And this is especially true of the jury in civil cases, for
while the number of persons who have reason to
apprehend a criminal prosecution is small, everyone is
liable to have a lawsuit.1
3
The satisfactions that citizens feel when they go through civil
jury service, from summons to verdict, include the pleasure of
fellow-feeling. "
4
110 See SMITH, supra note 13 and text accompanying notes 68-69.
. See generally Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427,
432-38 (2008) (exploring this metaphor about unseen and unknowable
processes and behavior in the jury room).
12 Shari Seidman Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expectations and
Reactions of Citizens Who Serve as Jurors, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CML
JURY SYSTEM 282, 285-86 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (summarizing social
science findings); Lassen County Superior Court, Jury Information: A Guide
to Jury Service, http://www.lassencourt.ca.gov/Jury-Info.htm (last visited
Sept. 12, 2009) ("Over and over, jurors who have served tell us they enjoy
being involved in making an important civic decision.").
.. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 274 (J.P. Mayer
ed., 1969).
114 Fellow-feeling is present in the criminal jury trial as well. Kevin Jon
Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Rea 17 (2008) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (citations omitted) (reporting that empathy
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4. Social and Jurisprudential Effects
In both The Theory of Moral Sentiments and his Lectures on
Jurisprudence,"5  Adam Smith identified social and
jurisprudential consequences of fellow-feeling. One might have
supposed that anything called "feeling" would arise episodically
in an individual and go no further. Instead, fellow-feeling
underlies all the bases of communal life, especially what Smith
described as propriety or the assignment of "approbation.""' 6
Fellow-feeling instructs human beings about even the quirkiest
or most trivial-sounding options before them, as Smith wrote,
including whether to deem a joke funny and how funny to deem
it."7 Societies impose meticulous judgments and boundaries
about the domain of empathy and the rightness of an emotional
118
response.
Although much of this enforcement lies outside the formal
reach of law, Smith took a particular interest in the enforcement
of fellow-feeling rules through legal doctrine. Torts being still
inchoate in the eighteenth century, the illustrations that Smith
devised necessarily referred to older fields of private law. He
found fellow-feeling in two property-law doctrines, occupation
affects jury decisionmaking in rape trials). See also Feigenson, Sympathy,
supra note 5, at 20-22 (noting the gap between extensive data about
sympathy in criminal adjudication on one hand, and scant data about
sympathy in civil adjudication on the other).
115 SMITH, supra note 13; ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE
(R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978).
116 SMITH, supra note 13, at 116.
"17 See RAPHAEL, supra note 3 and text accompanying note 83.
".. See K. Papadopoulou, The Development of Children's Understanding
of Negative Reflexive Social Emotions, in EVERYDAY CONCEPTIONS OF
EMOTION 333, 337 (James A. Russell et al. eds., 1995) (arguing that cultures
teach children how to manifest their emotions); Thorsten Gieser,
Embodiment, Emotion and Apathy, 8 ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 229 (2008)
(providing a summary of empathy in anthropological terms); Catherine Lutz
& Geoffrey White, The Anthropology of Emotions, 15 ANNUAL REV.
ANTHROPOLOGY 405, 428 (1986) (noting that the Ifaluk language, unlike
English, has a word meaning "justified anger").
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and prescription. 19
III. FELLOW-FEELING IN ACTION: INSTANCES FROM PRODUCTS
LIABILITY CASE LAW
We move to a synthesis of the two oppositional conditions
described in the last Part. Tort doctrines-including the
preponderance of the evidence rule; admissibility of evidence
criteria; legal categories of injury; and rigid deadlines to file
claims-function together to limit the power of fellow-feeling, a
construct that encompasses mutual sympathy, interdependencies
of feeling, and empathy.
All of these aspects of fellow-feeling clash with the rigid
personal-injury rules noted in Part I. Fellow-feeling is directed
toward one side in a dispute; any feeling directed toward only
one person or party in an interpersonal conflict will result in
partiality, rather than the impartiality that the law purports to
uphold in adjudication. Fellow-feeling is more psychological
than moral; case outcomes are supposed to derive from the
application of principles rather than unplanned, unmanageable
reactions rooted in individual psychology. Fellow-feeling's
warmth feels good; but warmth is problematic too: when a
personal injury claim goes to a jury, the judge gives instructions
on the law that condemn, or at least try to constrain, the force
of emotion.' 2° Instances of fellow-feeling, when they generate
119 Occupation, "the first instances of taking possession of something that
was not previously the private property of anyone," RAPHAEL, supra note 3,
at 106, made sense to Smith, who saw "sympathy or concurrence betwixt the
spectator and the possessor," id. at 108 (quoting Lectures on Jurisprudence),
when a possessor had pulled an apple from a tree in the wild and claimed it
as his own. As for prescription, which refers to exclusive usage over long
periods of time, Smith contended that a holder of property will expect "that
he will have the use of the thing occupied, and think he is injured by those
who would wrest it from him." Id. (quoting Lectures on Jurisprudence).
,20 See United States v. Grace, 408 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1000 (D. Mont.
2006) (noting media coverage and overall bias of the jurors); State v. Kelly,
942 A.2d 440, 454 (Conn. App. 2008) ("We do not discern any conduct by
the defendant as having invited these improper appeals to the emotions of the
jurors."); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 2.3 (2007); see
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social and jurisprudential effects, undermine the rigidity of
doctrine and are thus sources of instability rather than order.
These oppositional conditions coexist in a dialectical relation.
An episode of fellow-feeling can bring to light the unfairness of
a rigid rule; doctrines can arise or be changed to curb the power
of unchecked discretion, sympathy, or bias. The examples
gathered in this Part suggest a gendered pattern in the dialectic.
A. Fellow-Feeling Closes a Preponderance-of-Evidence Gap
on Causation
Some plaintiffs come to court with ambiguous, inexact
evidence-about how a defendant's defective product or
negligent conduct caused them an injury. Their experts disagree
with the defendant's experts. Alternative hypotheses remain
plausible; the dispute approaches equipoise."' The defendant
moves for summary judgment, or brings a motion in limine to
the same effect: Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden on causation,
says the defendant, because the weight of expertise does not
accept their contention.
Our divide between doctrine and fellow-feeling contrasts two
strategies for adjudication. Apply rules and principles
syllogistically, says the first strategy. Start with the major
premise: Daubert, or Frye if "general acceptance" is the rule;
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, or its state counterpart. Next
consider, as the minor premise, the particulars of the evidence
proffered, and determine whether it is sufficiently valid and
relevant for a jury to hear it.
Fellow-feeling recommends a different route. To break the
equipoise tie, fellow-feeling proposes, look at the plaintiff and
defendant. Which of the two is more compelling-more like
oneself, the decisionmaker-and which more alien and remote,
like the torturer in Adam Smith's tableau?
Now consider, for purposes of illustration, a plaintiff
stricken with mesothelioma who in the past had been exposed to
RAPHAEL, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
1 See COHEN, supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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asbestos at a worksite.' 2 Part of his case on causation is
straightforward, and unlikely to provoke resistance from the
defendant. Nobody doubts the connection between exposure to
this substance and mesothelioma: it is almost impossible for
anyone to contract the disease without having inhaled asbestos.
2 1
Evidence for this association would pass easily through any
judicial filter for admissibility.
The problem for a court, as the products liability scholar
Jane Stapleton has explained, concerns the attribution of
responsibility for the plaintiffs mesothelioma to a particular
supplier.124 Most asbestos plaintiffs cannot recall, or never knew,
whose product they inhaled. Their lawyers have tended to name
as defendants all the entities that they have reason to think
provided that worksite with asbestos. 2 5 At first blush, allowing
them to prevail appears fair. The plaintiffs worksite was a stew
of poison; each named defendant contributed to the stew.
Permissive results look like alternative liability, the longstanding
doctrine giving relief to plaintiffs who can establish tortious
conduct and their own injury but cannot pinpoint the malefactor
who hurt them. 
126
Yet courts that allow a mesothelioma victim to recover from
any named supplier among many give this plaintiff a judicial
gift, Stapleton observes. The uncertainty here is on etiology: A
court can be confident that asbestos causes mesothelioma, but it
cannot know how. Judges do know that mesothelioma, differing
12' Anita Bernstein, Asbestos Achievements, 37 Sw. U. L. REv. 691,
702-06 (2008) (discussing this example as a causation problem).
'23 For data on the thousands of such mesothelioma claims, see RAND
REPORT, supra note 29, at 71, 74.
124 Jane Stapleton, Two Causal Fictions at the Heart of U.S. Asbestos
Doctrine, 122 L.Q. REv. 189, 189-90 (2006).
121 See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla.
1985) (noting that the plaintiff had named eleven supplying defendants). Cf.
Envtl. Protection Agency, Consumer Guides: Asbestos Mesothelioma
Poisoning, http://www.consumer-guides.info/Asbestos/legislation/epa. html
(last visited Sept. 12, 2009) (noting that when bringing abatement claims,
plaintiffs frequently name all the manufacturers they know of, even ones that
had not produced the asbestos product in question).
126 DOBBS, supra note 40, at 426-29.
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in this respect from asbestosis, is not dose-related.
Mesothelioma victims report divergent levels of past exposure to
asbestos.'27 Mesothelioma (again unlike asbestosis, a disease that
takes forms that range from slight to unbearable) is an on-off
binary, which an individual either has or does not have.128
Asbestos-linked mesothelioma in an individual necessarily
originated in one of two types of exposure, which Stapleton calls
the "single-insult" and "threshold" hypotheses.2 9 The two
etiologies are mutually inconsistent; only one can be correct. If
the single-insult hypothesis is the correct one, each plaintiff
inhaled one deadly unit of asbestos and was stricken. Other
asbestos particles in his lungs might have injured him in other
ways, but they had nothing to do with his mesothelioma. The
threshold explanation, by contrast, proposes that the plaintiff
needed a certain minimum quantity of exposure to become
vulnerable. He experienced that minimum, and then inhaled
another increment of asbestos that pushed him over the
mesothelioma line. These explanations are the only ways to
attribute an indivisible, non-dose-related injury to toxic
exposure.
In allowing numerous plaintiffs to recover (often in full)
from defendants who were not the only suppliers to the relevant
workplace, courts implicitly make a choice between the two
hypotheses. They reject the single-insult etiology-because
whenever multiple suppliers sent asbestos to the workplace, it is
not more probable than not that a blamed defendant delivered
the deadly unit-and accept the threshold etiology. This
conclusion is baseless. The single-insult hypothesis is simpler,
more parsimonious, and at least equally plausible. As a theory
of how mesothelioma comes to afflict some but not all asbestos-
exposed persons, the threshold mechanism has no support of the
kind that establishes "validity" under the Daubert test or
27 Laura S. Welch et al., Asbestos Exposure Causes Mesothelioma, but
Not This Asbestos Exposure, 13 J. INT'L OCCUP'L ENVTL. HEALTH 318, 322
(2007).
128 Stapleton, supra note 124, at 191-92.
129 id.
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"general acceptance" under Frye.'30
Courts did not declare that they were disdaining the law of
evidence for these mesothelioma claims, or making an exception
in recognition of the extraordinary nature of asbestos. Defense
lawyers did not raise a single-insult versus threshold argument,
even though it might have defeated claims against their clients.
Consistent with fellow-felling as a psychological reaction rather
than the product of inquiry into moral rightness, plaintiffs'
lawyers did not appear conscious of the causation problem. No
one even seemed aware of it until Jane Stapleton published her
short article in 2006, well after developments in asbestos
liability doctrine had matured. In that article, Stapleton called
the end run around causation law one of "two causal fictions in
U.S. asbestos doctrine." 3' But the judicial acceptance of an
unadumbrated "threshold" hypothesis did not quite amount to a
fiction. Judges contrive and apply fictions consciously, toward
an end. 32  Here, a crucial barrier melted away from
mesothelioma claims without judicial analysis. If it caused this
outcome in asbestos litigation-and even if it did only that-then
fellow-feeling is a force of large economic consequence.
When one moves away from the exceptional setting of
asbestos liability, this sort of indulgent, pro-plaintiff leaping
over a causal mystery gets called a harsh name. The gender
subtext beneath attacks on "junk science"' 33 can emerge if one
asks an attacker to give an example of the phenomenon he
condemns from the civil liability record. Chances are he will
130 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594-95 (1993).
United States v. Frye, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
"3' This phrase formed her title. Stapleton, supra note 124.
132 See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 894 (6th ed. 1991) (defining
"legal fiction"). The Latin ancestor of the word is fingere, "to shape,"
implying consciousness.
133 My own thoughts on this phrase, including but not limited to
reflections on gender in it, appear in Bernstein, supra note 47, at 1217-18;
Anita Bernstein, Engendered by Technologies, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1, 80 n.390
(2003); Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1165, 1180
(2006).
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forgo a range of alternatives-evolutionary psychology, say'134-
to focus on a woman's claim. The notion that silicone leakage
from a breast implant compromises the immune system has been
a favored illustration.' A former Attorney General of the
United States has spied junk science in arguments that
pesticides, plastics, and electromagnetic fields cause breast
cancer, and in claims brought against the manufacturers of
Bendectin and Norplant, drugs prescribed only to women.'3 6 In
Galileo's Revenge, a book-length study of junk science, Peter
Huber devoted time to only one gender-neutral instance, the
false claim that Audi automobiles were prone to spontaneous
acceleration,'37 while denouncing as "junk" many accusations
that women tried to make in court, usually to no avail: a
medical scan took away psychic powers;... a contraceptive
spermicide caused a baby to be born with defects; 3 9 fetal
monitoring harms babies;'40 intrauterine devices cause pelvic
infections. 41
A female anatomical structure delivered to plaintiffs
Bendectin-a substance of interest to this Article because it was
134 On evolutionary psychology as more political ideology than science,
see SUSAN MCKINNON, NEO-LIBERAL GENETICS: THE MYTHS AND MORAL
TALES OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY (2006); on the desire to introduce
evidence pertaining to evolutionary psychology, see, e.g., Cunnings v.
Sirmons, 506 F.3d 1211, 1233 (10th Cir. 2007) (reviewing a contention that
the petitioner had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
lawyer had failed to consult "an anthropologist, evolutionary psychologist,
historian, or sociologist" to explain his "socio-economic 'White trash'
subculture"). Mr. Cunnings' contention failed, but denouncers of junk
science do not insist on success in court before they become alarmed.
' See, e.g., MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL 69-89 (1996); David
E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CAL. L. REV. 457, 459-64
(1999).
136 See Dick Thornburgh, Junk Science-The Lawyer's Ethical
Responsibilities, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 449, 449-52 (1998).
137 HUBER, supra note 30. Much of the Audi discussion in this bcok has
in mind incompetent women drivers.
,31 Id. at 4.
39 Id. at 174.
140 Id. at 201-02.
141 Id.
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prescribed only to pregnant women; 142 it was also the toxic
substance adjudicated in Daubert. 14 As a standard for proffered
evidence Daubert can, as we have noted, function
constrictively,' 44 but it makes constriction a choice, not a
mandate. Gendered fellow-feeling is free to influence this
choice. Any trial judge who presumes that men are sober and
dignified citizens who deserve a hearing when they accuse
someone of having wronged them, and that women's accusations
of wrongdoing originate in their own craziness or dishonesty-or
the contrary bias, one must hasten to say: that men are nutty
liars while women are sober and dignified-may, under the
Daubert-Joiner standard of review, 145 take his inclination into
account when considering a motion for summary judgment.
As our study of fellow-feeling has already indicated, this
judge might well be unaware that he holds any inclination.' 46
Skepticism can look to him like high standards: that is, a
rigorous sense of what injured persons have to prove under the
preponderance standard, or a belief that reason rather than
emotion (pity toward a plaintiff, outrage toward a negligent
defendant) must guide the adjudication of a personal injury
claim. The contrary stance can look like faith in the wisdom of
juries. Neither premise leads to reversible error, as long as he
refrains from abusing his discretion. 
147
Because judges do not make overt references to gendered
fellow-feeling when they apply Daubert, observers looking for it
can only try to compare analogous cases. The feminist tort
scholar Lucinda Finley offers a complement to fellow-feeling in
asbestos liability by recounting a contrary outcome in breast-
implant liability. 141 Women who alleged that their breast implants
gave them autoimmune diseases came to court with evidence on
141 Id. at 111-29.
143 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
'" See supra notes 4-50 and accompanying text.
141 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
146 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
147 See Bernstein, supra note 47, at 1218 (noting the abuse of discretion
standard as announced by Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142-43).
148 Finley, supra note 42, at 350.
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
causation, as did their adversaries.' The presiding judge,
Robert Jones, assembled a panel of scientific experts in a range
of disciplines, including epidemiology, to advise him on
questions of science. A neutral expert reviewed the partisan
reports from each field. Unsurprisingly, the plaintiffs'
epidemiologist found an association between breast implants and
autoimmune disease while the defendants' found none. The
court-appointed epidemiologist judged both of the dueling
reports well founded and recommended that both be admitted.150
Judge Jones rejected this recommendation, hewing to a
relative-risk criterion for admissibility."' His expert (who was
present because he knew more than the judge about what would
meet epidemiological standards) had not deemed it necessary for
claimants to get over that particular hurdle. After excluding the
plaintiffs' expert testimony for not clearing the relative-risk bar,
the judge also excluded the rest of their expert testimony, on the
ground that none of it could meet the epidemiological criterion
he had set. 152 He felt free to insist on a stringent application of
the preponderance criterion, just as asbestos judges had felt free
to leap over the same doctrinal barrier.
Another example of the disbelief that female litigants faced
when they made causal claims-a less famous instance than
breast implants, but equally suggestive of what fellow-feeling
could have done for their plight-appears in the litigation about
Parlodel, a drug marketed to suppress lactation.153 Women who
had been prescribed this drug sued its manufacturer for failure
149 Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996).
'5 Finley, supra note 42, at 353 (quoting Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1448).
13, In other words, Judge Jones held that unless the plaintiffs could show
that the autoimmune disease in question develops at least twice as often in
women with breast implants as it develops among all women, they could not
meet the preponderance criterion: they could not prove that exposure to the
harmful substance more probably than not caused their injury. Hall, 947 F.
Supp. at 1403.
152 Finley, supra note 42, at 353-55.
Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed
Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REv. 257, 268-70 (2005)
(discussing Parlodel). I am grateful to Professor Twerski for sharing his
thoughts about this litigation.
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to warn of the danger of stroke. A majority of these litigants lost
on Daubert-based summary judgment, even though the plaintiffs
had reliable evidence, including adverse reaction reports and
epidemiological studies, to support their contention that Parlodel
had caused them to suffer their injury. They also had human
studies that showed that patients who were given Parlodel would
experience vascular constriction, a condition that typically
precedes or accompanies strokes-an experience that stopped
when the drug was withdrawn.'TM None of their data sufficed to
lift them over the wall of skepticism to reach a jury:
Adverse Reaction Reports were deemed too idiosyncratic
and unreliable. Animal studies were given short shrift
because one cannot accurately liken animal reactions to
those of humans. Evidence that Parlodel, when
administered to a patient, caused vascular constriction
that receded when the drug was withdrawn and then
reappeared when the drug was introduced to the patient
(dechallenge/rechallenge), was not sufficient because the
patient did not actually suffer a stroke from the use of the
drug. And finally, the epidemiological studies were
deemed inconclusive. As Adverse Reaction Reports
began coming in from the use of Parlodel, the FDA
sought to get Sandoz [the manufacturer] to issue
warnings about the possible relationship of the drug and
strokes. Parlodel was, however, a very lucrative drug
and the company resisted for fear that it would cause a
sharp decrease in its profits.155
B. Fellow-Feeling Gives Some Victims the Time They Need
to Bring Claims
1. . . . Some Claim Early . . .
In the landmark Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. 1S6
'- Id. at 269 & n.69 (citing cases).
155 Id.
493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1974).
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the plaintiff, who suffered from asbestosis and then died of
mesothelioma, differed from most asbestos plaintiffs in that he
had experienced harm attributed to the toxic product to which he
was exposed. 57 This decision delivered the first cohort of
asbestos workers to American liability doctrine. Most had
injuries when they came to court. At present, the majority of
Clarence Borel's successor-plaintiffs still alive are, in the
peculiar jargon of asbestos liability, "unimpaired."1 18  An
adjective that means "having no injury" is used to modify a
noun meaning "person entitled to claim that he has an injury."
Offering another neologism by way of oxymoron, asbestos
liability has introduced the "inactive docket." 5 9 A docket is
supposed to mean a list of "causes for trial"'6-causes that are
active in that they are pending.16' The inactive docket, however,
consists of cases that are not under consideration. Also known as
a deferred docket or a pleural registry, this innovation allows
uninjured plaintiffs to obtain an index number and preserve their
asbestos claims from dismissal on statute of limitations
grounds. 
162
The deferred docket, manifesting sympathy and empathy for
exposed plaintiffs, 63 rescues claims from the oblivion of
demurrer and Rule 12(b). Non-asbestos plaintiffs who try to sue
without having been harmed present a contrast: they lose and
157 The point is controversial, see RAND REPORT, supra note 29, at 76,
and rests in part on how one defines an injury. Here I follow the RAND
convention and focus on impairment, in the sense of an impediment to daily
living. Id. at 7.
118 See id. The first case to recognize an unimpaired plaintiff was Bernier
v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 516 A.2d 534 (Me. 1986).
159 See Green, supra note 62, at 986 n.99 (explaining the term).
160 IV OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 912.
161 "On the docket," according to the Oxford English Dictionary means
"in hand; under consideration." Id.
162 Mark A. Behrens & Monica G. Parham, Stewardship for the Sick:
Preserving Assets for Asbestos Victims Through Inactive Docket Programs, 33
TEX. TECH L. REv. 1, 8-11 (2001).
163 See supra Part lII.C, at 51 and Part IV.A.2 (reviewing judicial
conclusions that exposed-yet-unimpaired plaintiffs had suffered an injury that
courts would recognize).
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disappear. Today, in Jerome Frank's memorably phrased
"topsy-turvy land,"' 6' advocates appear perverse in their
reactions to this innovation. Defense interests give thanks for
what is a boon to their adversaries, 16 while plaintiffs' lawyers
oppose the inactive docket because it includes no mechanism to
pay them for their personal-injury advocacy on behalf of people
who have no injury.' 66
Another judicial reprieve from doctrine permitted plaintiffs
to sue for their increased risk of cancer in the future. Like the
causation maneuvers described above, this device excused
plaintiffs from the preponderance rule: They recovered for this
increased risk even when they could not prove that they would
more probably than not develop cancer. Courts today seldom
deploy the increased-risk device because another judicial
creation, an ad hoc repeal of the "single action rule" that had
forced plaintiffs to complain about everything that had happened
to them in one pleading,1 67 has made it unnecessary. The modem
plaintiff can split his claim.
2 .... Some Claim Late...
Statutes of limitation, as was noted, 61 purport to bar the
filing of claims irrespective of their merits. Implicitly they
concede that the plaintiffs' contentions might be perfectly sound
but for their staleness. In contrast to this cool deployment of a
calendar to toss out a complaint, an approach to personal-injury
'6' Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952)
(Frank, J., dissenting).
165 See Mark A. Behrens & Manuel Lopez, Unimpaired Asbestos
Dockets: They Are Constitutional, 24 REv. LITIG. 253 (2006); Behrens &
Parham, supra note 162; Victor E. Schwartz et al., Consolidation Versus
Inactive Dockets (Pleural Registries) and Case Management Plans That Defer
Claims Filed by the Non-Sick, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 271, 276 (2003).
16 RAND REPORT, supra note 29, at 26.
167 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation
Gone Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress,
and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REv. 815, 819 (2002) (citations
omitted).
'6 See supra Part I.D.
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adjudication rooted in fellow-feeling would respond to the
degree of emotion triggered by the claimants' plight. A plight
that inspired little sympathy would win little or no relief from
the rigidity of a statutory deadline; a compelling plight that
stirred fellow-feeling would permit lenient exceptions.
Numerous exceptions fill the asbestos annals: judges rescued
asbestos claims that would otherwise have run aground on
statutes of limitation. Late filings became suddenly timely
enough with the help of a discovery rule, first recognized by the
Supreme Court in Urie v. Thompson,' 69 a 1949 FELA case
similar on its facts to the asbestos actions that would later
commence.' 7° The discovery rule extends a statute of limitation
by starting accrual not when the plaintiff experienced injurious
contact but at some later date relating to discovery of that
injury. Urie suggested that an exposure claim accrues when a
reasonable person would have received a diagnosis of injury.
Given long latency periods for toxic exposure, the discovery
rule can extend statutory limitation periods by decades.
Courts and legislatures give further aid to plaintiffs on their
timing problem by turning on the limitation clock much later
than normal. For most personal-injury plaintiffs, causes of
action accrue at the time that bodies are harmfully touched. For
asbestos, accrual does not commence until much later-when
victims discover their harm, with discovery leniently
construed. 7' This judicial generosity is not unique to asbestos,
but asbestos cases are prominent in the annals of reprieve. For
instance, courts have held that knowledge about asbestos
169 Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
170 Tom Urie, who had worked on the Missouri Pacific Railroad for
about thirty years, suffered from a pulmonary disease diagnosed as silicosis.
Id. at 165-66.
171 See, e.g., Rose v. A., C., & S., Inc., 796 F.2d 294, 297 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding that the cause of action did not accrue until the plaintiff knew
not only about the illness but the identity of the manufacturer); Karjala v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 159-60 (8th Cir. 1975)
(approving a jury instruction telling jurors they were free to determine the
time at which plaintiff should have realized he had a claim for his
longstanding asbestosis).
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exposure did not constitute discovery for purposes of a
mesothelioma claim,' and that the judicially recognized
extension of a limitation period based on time of discovery must
benefit only asbestos plaintiffs.'73
Judicially improvised doctrines that reconceive late filing as
timely complement the creation of the deferred docket. Taken
together, these judicial innovations assure litigants who were
exposed to asbestos that any time is a good time to bring a
claim. Sue then, or sue now, or sue later. Plaintiffs who are not
yet injured will nevertheless receive an attentive welcome in
court, and if they were exposed long ago, too far beyond the
limitation period, then the timing of their injury is boosted by a
push forward.
3. . . . And Some Claim Female74
Like other pro-plaintiff shifts in asbestos liability, the time-
of-discovery approach to accrual looks like an instance of
common sense mixed with sympathy for an injured person. Only
in Jerome Frank's topsy-turvy land mentioned above can you
"die before you are conceived, or be divorced before ever you
marry, or harvest a crop never planted, or bum down a house
never built, or miss a train running on a non-existent
railroad."' Of course, courts should not expect a plaintiff to sue
"' Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (R.B. Ginsburg, J.); Sopha v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 601
N.W.2d 627, 634-35 (Wis. 1999).
7 Pustejovsky v. Rapid-American Corp., 35 S.W. 3d 643, 653 (Tex.
2000); see also Bruce J. McKee, Alabama: A Jurisdiction Out of Control?,
41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 637, 641 (1997) (noting that Alabama statutory law
refuses to recognize the discovery rule except for two types of claims, fraud
and asbestos).
'14 Cf. David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why
"Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1999) (adverting to
another immutable characteristic that receives detrimental treatment backed
by law).
"' Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952)
(Frank, J., dissenting). Frank was objecting to the application of a
Connecticut statute of limitation.
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before he could know he was injured. It should come as no
surprise that as early in 1949, well before the phrase "toxic
torts" took form, Urie v. Thompson recognized time of
discovery as the correct trigger for a railroad worker's exposure
claim. 76 Any triumph of good sense over a perverse, rigid,
formalistic obstacle looks like justice.
Compared to the experience of women with dormant claims,
however, the reprieve for asbestos plaintiffs is problematic.
Young women who learned that their reproductive organs were
damaged by DES, a toxin that their mothers had ingested during
pregnancy, illustrated the discovery problem in classic terms.
Many of them sought legal counsel as soon as they knew they
were injured and, like Tom Urie of FELA fame, tried to file
suit promptly. They did not delay in learning about the link
between maternal DES and their physical anomalies, either.
Lawyers turned them away."' Spurred into activism in New
York, a redoubt of early "time of injury" deadlines, some DES
claimants joined with other reformers to lobby the state
legislature for help.' They did not win the discovery rule that
their counterparts had achieved so easily in asbestos litigation,
but did get the lesser measure of a revival statute-a special new
law that gave them a year to file what otherwise would have
been stale claims.'79 Courts have held plaintiffs tightly to the
terms of this reprieve. 8 °
In one of the many decisions that freed asbestos plaintiffs
176 Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949). One scholar reports that the
first use of the term "toxic tort" in a judicial opinion occurred in 1979.
Gerald W. Boston, Toxic Apportionment: A Causation and Risk Contribution
Model, 25 ENVTL. L.J. 549, 551 n. 1 (1995).
177 See Anita Bernstein, Markets of Mothers: Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly &
Co., in TORTS STORIES 151, 163 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman
eds., 2003).
178 Id. at 164-65.
'79 Id. at 163.
,o For example, the revival statute was a condition precedent, rather than
an adjustment to the statute of limitations, as one New York appellate court
admonished a plaintiff who tried to sue after attaining majority, and so was
not subject to tolling. Singer v. Eli Lilly & Co., 549 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655-56
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
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from the "single action" characterization of a limitation
period, 8' the Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed earlier
holdings on this issue.' 82 Its discussion nicely juxtaposes two
contrasts: compassionate relief for asbestos plaintiffs versus by-
the-book severity for other claimants. Although the first plaintiff
in Wisconsin to win the favor of a discovery rule had been a
woman injured by the Dalkon Shield contraceptive, numerous
other women surveyed in Sopha v. Owens-Coming Fibreglas
Corp. fared less well. One Wisconsin litigant learned that her
cause of action accrued when she received a blood transfusion
that impaired her fertility, not when her infertility manifested
itself.'83 Another plaintiff saw her claim rejected because she
needed years to connect her disabling emotional distress to her
having been molested by a priest, coupled with negligence by
the Archdiocese of Milwaukee.'4
The sexual abuse of children offers a pertinent contrast to
asbestos.' 5 Researchers estimate that one in three women and
one in five men before the age of 18 experience sexual abuse in
the United States. 186 There is no reason to suppose that this
abuse was much rarer in past decades, when a taboo tended to
' Sopha v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 601 N.W.2d 627, 642
(Wis. 1999).
182 Id. at 636.
183 Olson v. St. Croix Valley Memorial Hosp., 201 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Wis.
1972).
184 Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 1995).
185 1 mention sexual abuse that occurs in childhood rather than child
abuse more generally because it has an especially extensive literature. See
generally Elizabeth A. Wilson, Suing for Lost Childhood: Child Sexual
Abuse, the Delayed Discovery Rule, and the Problem of Finding Justice for
Adult-Survivors of Child Abuse, 12 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S L.J. 145, 249 (2003)
(arguing that other types of "child maltreatment" should be of at least equal
interest to the law).
" See Leslie Miller, Sexual Abuse Survivors Find Strength to Speak in
Numbers, USA TODAY, Aug. 27, 1992, at D6 (reviewing studies of
childhood sexual abuse); see also Rosemarie Ferrante, Note, The Discovery
Rule: Allowing Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse the Opportunity
for Redress, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 199, 205 (1995) (reporting a slightly higher
estimate).
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suppress mention of the subject."7 How many victims would
possess what they need to recover in tort (access to counsel,
willingness to sue, proof that their harm occurred, a defendant
holding assets, damages amenable to monetary expression) is
anyone's guess, but as a starting point, one-third or one-fifth, or
for that matter one thirty-fifth, of a very large population yields
many prospective clients for the personal-injury bar. The
collapse of family and charitable immunities in the middle of the
twentieth century, around when the Supreme Court first granted
its discovery-liberality to a railroad worker, could have enabled
claims for battery or negligence against millions of parents,
stepfathers, other relatives, churches, and parochial schools.
It never did. Nancy Tyson, who in 1983 alleged that her
father had sexually abused her in the 1960s, appears in the law
review literature as a pioneer. Before then, few other adult
victims had shared Tyson's willingness to challenge the statute
of limitations and assert entitlement to a discovery rule.'88 The
Washington Supreme Court dismissed her complaint as time-
barred.' 89 In ensuing years, a majority of states, including
Washington, rejected Tyson v. Tyson and adopted a discovery
rule for claims of childhood sexual abuse. 9' But these discovery-
rule reforms are stingy when compared to the generosity that
asbestos claimants receive. ' 9' The extensions are arbitrarily
187 See generally JOHN CREWDSON, BY SILENCE BETRAYED: SEXUAL
ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1988) (reporting shifting assessments of
the phenomenon by Freud in the late nineteenth century); MARK
PENDERGRAST, VICTIMS OF MEMORY: SEX ABUSE ACCUSATIONS AND
SHATTERED LIVES 30 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that Kinsey data from the 1940s
reported that 24 percent of female respondents said that an adult had
approached them for sexual contact when they were 13 or younger).
'8' Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986). Although Tyson
claimed that her memories of the abuse had been repressed, id. at 227,
discovery of one's own sexual past abuse can be delayed by circumstances
other than repressed memory. For example, a victim could have forgotten the
assault that caused her a real injury, and then been told about it years later by
a reliable eyewitness.
9 Id. at 229-30.
'90 Ferrante, supra note 186, at 214-15.
'9' In Clay v. Kuhl, 727 N.E.2d 217, 222 (Ill. 2000), a plaintiff alleging
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short, unaligned with the amount of time plaintiffs need to frame
and prosecute a claim.1 92 In some states plaintiffs cannot receive
the extension unless they have corroborating evidence about the
contact and its effects-a burden never imposed on plaintiffs
who discover asbestos-originated impairments belatedly and one
that reminds observers of the old misogynous corroboration
requirement for rape claims.1 93 Other states, like New York,
home of the skimpy DES revival statute, have not budged to
recognize the problem of delayed discovery, and hold sexual-
abuse plaintiffs to the short limitation period.194 No child-abuse
plaintiff who brings a belated complaint, in sum, can count on
judicial indulgence with respect to timing, the boon that asbestos
plaintiffs routinely obtain.
If she can get past her statute of limitations problem, this
plaintiff will not enjoy the presumption of dignity and mental
clarity that asbestos-exposed workers appear to share. 95 The
small fraction of women who seek redress for the sexual abuse
that took place during their childhoods, especially those who sue
their fathers, are portrayed and perceived as crazy: Either the
molestation they allege really happened and made them mentally
ill, or their belief of having been abused is a delusion, formed in
a sick mind.96
sexual abuse argued that she was situated similarly to an asbestos plaintiff and
should receive the same leniency for her delay in filing. The court rejected
her contention. Id. at 222.
192 Marci Hamilton, Why Ensuring Accountability for Clergy Sexual
Abuse of Children Has Proved So Difficult, Even Though It Remains So
Crucial, FINDLAW'S WRIT, May 6, 2004, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
hamilton/20040506. html.
193 See Wilson, supra note 185, at 154-55. This requirement, long
abolished in the United States, endures in some applications of Islamic law.
See Manar Waheed, Note, Domestic Violence in Pakistan: The Tension
Between Intervention and Sovereign Autonomy in Human Rights Law, 29
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 937, 965 (2004) (noting that under zina in Pakistan, the
crime of rape can be established only by the rapist's confession or eyewitness
testimony from four Muslim males).
'94 See Ferrante, supra note 186, at 202-03.
'9' See supra Part I.B.
'96 See Wilson, supra note 185, at 155 (observing that the "putative
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Understood in the context of fellow-feeling, a lapse of years
will cause deteriorations in memory that vary by the category of
claimant. Asbestos plaintiffs might forget a little: Like the
spectator himself, they are only human. 97  Sexual-abuse
plaintiffs, by contrast, have become warped by the retelling of
dubious stories inside their heads. 1
98
C. Fellow-Feeling Answers the Question of Whether a
Plaintiff Suffered an Injury
Fellow-feeling fills a void whenever sympathy and empathy
impel an observer to deem another person harmed by exposure
to poison. The welcome that courts gave to inchoate asbestos
claims, where a plaintiff could show tortious exposure but not
injury, illustrates this phenomenon. 9' Missing factual detail
central to each claim that this person, who brought an action for
a physical injury, has no marker of harm on his own body-does
not defeat the assertion when the decisionmaker-spectator
(slightly changing the subject) can ask himself, "How would I
feel if I had inhaled asbestos that was put into my work
environment by a heedless supplier? I'd feel injured, that's how
mental illness" of claimants is linked to the discovery rule).
'97 For trenchant commentary on how lawyers enhanced their recall, see
Walter Olson, Thanks for the Memories, REASON, June 1998,
http://www.overlawyered.com/articles/olson/memories.html; see also W.
William Hodes, The Professional Duty to Horseshed Witnesses-Zealously,
Within the Bounds of the Law, 30 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1343, 1354 (1999)
(arguing that helping a client remember brand names on asbestos packages
that he last saw decades ago does not necessarily create false testimony).
'g ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF
REPRESSED MEMORY: FALSE MEMORIES AND ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL
ABUSE 24 (1994) (contending that some therapists tell patients that "[t]he
existence of doubt and skepticism is an indication that the memories do, in
fact, exist. Ignore your doubts. Trust your feelings .... Don't seek external
proof. . . ."); PENDERGRAST, supra note 187, at 44 (attributing to therapists
a litany of "[riehearse your memories, repeating them, writing them down,
making them more real. Cherish those people who support your new belief
system, but jettison those who express even the slightest doubt").
9 See supra Part HI.B.
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I'd feel. Don't tell me nothing has happened to me when I have
poison fibers in my lungs." Such an observer will honor the
grievance now and assume it will be priced later. This
conclusion demands an overt rewrite to existing doctrine, 2°° but
the swift psychological reaction of fellow-feeling obscures the
revision.
Asbestos liability is noteworthy for other instances of
spontaneous manifestation that so many observers find in it-
especially the belief that this liability just happened, like a force
of nature. When assessing the phenomenon, commentators see a
tsunami.' °1 Entrepreneurial lawyers brought thousands of actions,
overwhelming the dockets; naturally, judges had to consolidate
the filings and administer a settlement apparatus. One state
supreme court judge testified before Congress about judicial
haplessness. What could we do? Under the circumstances, he
said, "fairness and truth" had to give way:
Think about a county circuit judge who has dropped on
her 5,000 cases all at the same time .... [I]f she
scheduled all 5,000 cases for one week trials, she would
not complete her task until the year 2095. The judge's
first thought then is, "How do I handle these cases
quickly and efficiently?" The judge does not purposely
ignore fairness and truth, but the demands of the system
require speed and dictate case consolidation even where
202the rules may not allow joinder.
Nice touch there, the feminine generic for a group of mostly
male decisionmakers: it so happens that women who observed or
adjudicated asbestos complaints have been less inclined than men
to passive acquiescence vis-A-vis plaintiffs' initiatives and "the
demands of the system." 2 3 Let us stray a step further from
200 See supra Part I.C (noting the tenet that a personal injury plaintiff
must have an injury).
201 See Bernstein, supra note 122, at 714-15, on the uses of "tsunami"
and other outsized metaphors to describe asbestos litigation.
2 Conrad L. Mallett, Jr., former chief justice of the Michigan Supreme
Court, quoted in Mark A. Behrens & Phil Goldberg, The Asbestos Litigation
Crisis: The Tide Appears to Be Turning, 12 CONN. INs. L.J. 477, 485 (2005).
m On the short list of farsighted politicians, there was Millicent
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gendered reality and imagine, in place of a female county circuit
judge, a female complaint of large magnitude. Next we may
consider whether courts would regard this complaint as
describing a real injury.
Because things that injure women in their reproductive
capacity may seem fundamentally different from a toxin in the
air like asbestos, the thought-experiment I propose relates to a
dangerous product that, like asbestos, does its harm away from
the pelvis: lead-contaminated housing and consumer goods.
Imagine a coalition of parents and lawyers inspired to bring
products liability actions against a host of defendants-they
might start with offshore toy manufacturers and U.S.-based
sellers-for exposing children to this poison.' ° When nearly 30
million toys were recalled in 2007, most of them because of lead
contamination, 2°' a large volume of litigation did not ensue;
imagine that it did. Millions of toys, millions of children. The
Fenwick, who, advocating for her constituents (both workers and businesses)
in asbestos-scarred New Jersey, led congressional efforts to introduce a
compensation scheme soon after the fateful Borel decision; on the bench,
Janis Jack, who made short work of the related silicosis litigation, and Helen
Freedman, famed for her case management skills; and in the academy, Jane
Stapleton.
"a Hypothetical children as a contrast to the men who bring personal
injury claims does not deviate from the male/female binary explored in this
Article. Women and children line up together in numerous respects. Western
intellectual traditions ascribe similar characteristics-among them weakness,
blankness, impulsiveness, and a reduced capacity for ratiocination-to them
both. Compare Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect,
111 HARV. L. REv. 445, 456-67 (1997) (recounting views about women),
with Jessica Kulynych, No Playing in the Public Sphere: Democratic Theory
and the Exclusion of Children, 27 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 231 (2001)
(recounting views about children). The patriarchal household contains a male
head resting above that which belongs to him: woman, children, servants,
possessions. Inside both households and public policy, laboring for the well-
being of children is women's terrain. NANCY FOLBRE, WHO PAYS FOR THE
KIDS? GENDER AND THE STRUCTURES OF CONSTRAINT (1994). Lest this
summary register as obsolete, I invite readers to search online for recent
materials on "children and the law," or "children and policy," and see which
gender's names come up.
'0' The President and Product Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2008, at
A18.
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litigation could spread beyond children injured by toys and
encompass other lead-contaminated products found in a typical
American household.206
Borrow from the asbestos experience to make the story lurid:
plaintiffs' lawyers setting up recruitment stations in
kindergartens and day-care centers; forum-shopping travels to
distant plaintiff-friendly state courts; pediatricians on the payroll
as partisan expert witnesses; demands for decades of elaborate
medical monitoring; large-scale distribution (maybe at public
elementary schools) of testing kits for low-income people to take
home; cris de coeur from mother-plaintiffs about their severe
emotional distress. Toy specialist lawyers would join forces with
more experienced residential-building lawyers, revitalizing a
litigation history that has so far given little relief to lead-exposed
plaintiffs. As for magnitude, imagine that these lawyers could
recruit as clients the same fraction of exposed persons as did the
asbestos lawyers. While we're writing our parable, we could
make our lead-paint lawyers mostly mothers-perfectly possible,
with thousands of women in the United States combining
childrearing with successful law practices.0 7
This litigation would appear to lack merit. Few children or
other individuals in the cohort would have suffered an
206 Making random tests, Consumers Union found dangerous levels of
lead in "samples of dishware, jewelry, glue stick caps, vinyl backpacks,
children's ceramic tea sets, and other toys and items." It claims that children
suffer developmental harm at lead-levels that are lower than what the federal
government deems dangerous, and adverts to studies suggesting that lifetime
lead exposure could be the cause of neurocognitive decline in elderly adults.
Consumer Reports: Tests Find Lead in More Products, Oct. 29, 2007,
available at http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core-product__safety/0050
71.html. On these studies, see Early Lead Exposure May Hasten Old-Age
Mental Decline, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 28, 2008, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22787587/page/2/.
207 More than half the female lawyers in the U.S. who earn more than
$100,000 a year are mothers. SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT, CHOOSING A LIFE:
PROFESSIONAL WOMEN AND THE QUEST FOR CHILDREN 97 (2002) (estimating
the proportion as between 51% and 78%). See also CYNTHIA FUCHS
EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 361-62 (1993) ("Perhaps one answer to the
question of why successful women lawyers are usually married and often
have children is that good lawyers are problem solvers.").
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impairment. For those really hurt, an insurmountable defendant-
identification problem would imperil recovery. Doctrine says
that mothers may not recover for the emotional distress that
follows impacts to their children unless they meet a host of
requirements absent here.08  American courts would lack
jurisdiction over at least some foreign defendants. Courts would
find it odd to unite defendants as disparate as, say, a factory in
China rushing to fill an order for an American toy brand with an
investor who had bought an old residential apartment building in
decades past.
In sum, if American lawyers would do with lead exposure
what they did with asbestos-recruit and retain plaintiffs without
first confirming that they were really hurt, file lawsuits at a
level pitched to overwhelm the docket ("5,000 cases all at the
same time"), throw together a m6lange of defendants in the
same action despite the lack of connection among them, try to
bolster flawed claims by aggregating them with less flawed ones
(for asbestos, bringing in attenuated entity defendants after the
original suppliers vanished into the mists of bankruptcy; for my
hypothetical, including mothers as plaintiffs), and along the way
refuse to be governed by elementary doctrine about injury,
causation, and procedure-then I daresay a "judge's first
thought" would not be, "How do I handle these cases quickly
and efficiently?" No judge would see his choices as limited to
(a) capitulation-consolidation-settlement and (b) booking his
calendar through a distant year like 2095. The judge would view
"these cases" as the fruit of derangement and chaos: crazy
mothers, money-mad lawyers. He would think of his court as
under siege.
Instead of consolidating cases so that the meritorious
minority would prop up the injury-free majority and thereby
create settlement value for otherwise unavailing claims, our
judge would react in Rule 11 terms, and try to protect his court
from what he would deem at best a frivolous onslaught. A
hardliner would dismiss the pleadings and sanction the lawyers.
208 DOBBS, supra note 40, at 840-41 (describing limited judicial liberality
regarding zone-of-danger requirements).
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A more tolerant judge might take a leaf from the Solerwitz
case,20 which responded politely but firmly to 4600 ill-founded
petitions that an attorney brought on behalf of air traffic
controllers that President Reagan had fired in 1982.
The extravagance of an inactive docket for unimpaired
asbestos claimants is demonstrated by imagining a similar
structure to favor our hypothetical plaintiffs. Shall we wait to
see whether children exposed to lead develop brain injuries,
meanwhile keeping the entities that they might choose to sue
(paint makers, other manufacturers, builders, landlords, schools,
government housing programs) on the liability hook? After all,
the New England Journal of Medicine has said that sixteen
percent of American children "have been mentally and
neurologically damaged because of exposure" to this toxic
substance. 2'° No, we shall not. Threats to the welfare of children
matter only when they can, "accurately or fancifully, be laid at
the women's doorstep," wrote Katha Pollitt when the medically
spurious clich6 of "crack babies" had started to pull mothers
into criminal courts while other sources of harm to their
children-racism, poverty, male violence-drew little attention.
"If the mother isn't to blame, then no one is to blame." 21' Lead-
poisoned children and their mothers have not received the
nurture of fellow-feeling.
IV. EMOTION (OCCASIONALLY) HONORED IN PERSONAL-INJURY
ADJUDICATION
Fellow-feeling starts out as an emotional concordance and
then moves to judgment. As Adam Smith explained, a spectator
looks judgmentally at the emotions or "passions" of another
' The Federal Circuit designated twelve of Solerwitz's filings as
representative, ordered him to be bound by how they came out-unfavorably
to his clients, of course-and held off suspending him from practice before
the court until he defied its order with more petitions. In re Solerwitz, 848
F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
"0 Katha Pollitt, Fetal Rights, Women's Wrongs, in REASONABLE
CREATURES: ESSAYS ON WOMEN AND FEMINISM 169, 184 (1995).
2 Id. at 186.
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person, asking himself whether these responses appear "just and
proper, and suitable to their objects." 21 1 We have considered
Smith's interpretation of the English common law with reference
to fellow-feeling." 3 From this base, one may infer that the law
treats emotion judgmentally too, withholding or bestowing
approval for various categories of feelings.
In the context of personal injury law, doctrine can withhold
or bestow approval for feeling with the general rule that
negligently inflicted emotional injury is not compensable.1 4 If,
as this Article contends, fellow-feeling leads courts to deviate
from rules of general application, it becomes possible for limited
categories of emotional damage to win approval. Judicial
sympathy welcomes a small fraction of plaintiffs who seek
redress for emotional harm, and spectators react to allegations of
injury with emotions of their own.
A. Fellow-Feeling Offers Comfort to Some Plaintiffs
1. Validating Plaintiffs' Fears
Culpable infliction of fear, an injury that affects "mental or
emotional equilibrium," is among the "ethereal torts" that courts
find problematic." 5 Judges have long regarded claims of
emotional distress as difficult to administer and repair. Before
the late twentieth century, they usually insisted that any plaintiff
who sought redress for negligently inflicted emotional distress,
of which fear is one type, come to court with evidence of
physical consequences: either a traumatic impact on their bodies
216or an observable manifestation of the harm alleged .
Like other gatekeeping devices surveyed earlier in this
212 SMITH, supra note 13, at 16.
213 See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
214 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 5, at 700 (explaining the traditional
stance).
2' See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
116 James F. d'Entremont, Fear Factor: The Future of Cancerphobia and
Fear of Future Disease Claims in the Toxicogenomic Age, 52 LoY. L. REV.
807, 809 (2006).
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Article, the physical-consequences requirement greeted plaintiffs
with a presumption of skepticism.217 Courts worried that absent
such a criterion to work as a filter, "spurious" claims of
emotional injury would prevail. 218  The combination of
recognizing the cause of action, on one hand, while burdening it
with a physical-consequences element, on the other, suggests
concern about two dangers: first, that wrongfully inflicted,
unfaked emotional distress would not be remedied and, second,
that nonexistent or exaggerated emotional distress would tug at
heartstrings and generate a (wrongful) award of damages. The
gendered version of fellow-feeling explored in this Article
predicts that courts would divide their remedial attentions along
a gendered line. Facing male plaintiffs, they would worry about
undercompensation and be lenient; facing female plaintiffs, they
would worry about spurious or otherwise unsound claims for
redress, and be severe.
Fear-of-future-illness decisions supports this prediction-but
only in part. Cases reach divergent results. Some male plaintiffs
lose; some groups that include female plaintiffs win.219
Nevertheless, the sieve that judges use to filter asbestos
claims is noteworthy for its generous wide mesh. From the
Supreme Court down to a host of lower forums, judges have
agreed that asbestosis, for example, will suffice to support a
fear-of-cancer claim.220 Asbestosis being neither necessary nor
sufficient to cause cancer,22' this association does not rest on
217 See supra Part I.E.
2,8 d'Entremont, supra note 216, at 809 (quoting Prosser & Keeton on
the Law of Torts).
"9 See generally In re Methyl Teriary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Products
Liab. Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 303, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (surveying
divergent approaches to the physical-consequences requirement for fear-of-
cancer claims).
220 See Norfolk & W. Rwy v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2003); Jones v.
CSX Transp., 337 F.3d 1316, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Jackson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 415 (5th Cir. 1986); Owens v.
Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee, 1987 US Dist LEXIS 5961, *4 (E.D. Pa.
1987); see also Williams v. Am. Optical Corp., 985 So. 2d 23, 29-30 (Fla.
App. 2008).
22" Welch et al., supra note 127, at 322 (noting that mesothelioma
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principle. Judges have offered scant explanation for their
beneficence.
Courts respond to women's attempts to receive compensation
for fear with a very different analytical rigor. In a rare departure
from the judicial consensus that DES plaintiffs cannot recover
for emotional distress, one trial court distinguished the no-
recovery precedents by observing that a DES plaintiff's
particular physical manifestation was "premalignant,"222 implying
that for DES litigants, only a premalignant condition could
support a claim for emotional distress.2' Asbestosis is not a
premalignant condition. 4 Case law does report a pro-plaintiff
departure in a DES case,225 and courts have rejected many fear-
of-cancer claims that asbestos-exposed plaintiffs have tried to
bring.2 6 Victory for these male plaintiffs is far from assured.
But given the difficulty of recovering for negligent infliction of
emotional distress-the claim has never been a judicial
favorite227-asbestos-exposed plaintiffs have an unusually strong
requires much less exposure to asbestos than asbestosis requires).
222 McAdams v. Eli Lilly & Co., 638 F. Supp. 1173, 1174 (N.D. Ill.
1986).
223 Id.
224 "The DES stories were as heart-wrenching as the stories told by
families who suffered from the effects of asbestos or Agent Orange," one
judge has remarked, from the vantage point of knowing all three sets of
"stories" well. Bilello v. Abbott Laboratories, 825 F. Supp. 475, 481
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (Weinstein, J.) (denying a recusal motion that accused the
judge of, inter alia, being too sympathetic to DES plaintiffs). Decisional law
does not align with this informed opinion about parity between the two
genders.
22. See Wetherill v. Univ. of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1559 (N.D.
I11. 1983).
226 See, e.g., Dragon v. Cooper/T Smith Stevedoring Co., Inc., 726 So.
2d 1006, 1010 (La. App. 1999) (rejecting claim brought under the Jones Act
because plaintiffs could not show physical manifestations of their distress);
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 167, at 828-31 (reviewing rejections of the
claim).
... Brian L. Church, Note, Balancing Corrective Justice and Deterrence:
Injury Requirements and the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 60
ALA. L. REV. 697 (2007) (arguing that courts have focused closely on the
injuries that emotional-distress plaintiffs allege in part as a gate-keeping
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chance of being compensated for their anxiety.
Emotional-distress asbestos litigants have prevailed only
when they have litigated from the workplace, a male-dominated
venue. One legal encyclopedia entry about emotional distress
and toxic exposure has a heading called "Home-Asbestos,"
under which all ten decisions assessed home-based emotional
distress claims, many of them brought by women; not one
accepted the claim.228 Women married to asbestos workers lose
when they try to blame asbestos suppliers for their emotional
plights .229 In another contrast between male and female emotional
states, the relative-risk hurdle that has defeated female claimants
in the post-Daubert era does not seem to burden asbestos
workers who bring emotional-distress claims. Judges could ask a
plaintiff the blunt question how likely it is that what he dreads
will actually happen-and make 'more probable than not' a real
230
criterion for recovery-but generally have not done so.
The asbestos anomaly is amplified when one considers how
seldom plaintiffs can recover for emotional harm that comes
from a recurring or ongoing point of origin. For women,
device).
228 Gregory G. Sarno, Infliction of Emotional Distress: Toxic Exposure, 6
A.L.R. 5th 162 (1992). Not all the plaintiffs were women. See, e.g., Burns
v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 29 (Ariz. App. 1987) (ruling against
residents of a trailer park, gender unspecified). Most of the cases in this entry
involve wives who were exposed to asbestos by doing their husbands'
laundry.
229 See Amader v. Johns-Manville Corp., 514 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (E.D.
Pa. 1981) (rejecting a claim by a wife who feared that her asbestos-exposed
husband would develop cancer); Cathcart v. Keene Industrial Insulation, 471
A.2d 493, 509 (Pa. Super. 1984) (rejecting a claim by a wife that she feared
cancer from having inhaled asbestos while doing her husband's laundry).
230 For example, one study found that out of a million workers exposed
to asbestos in the Pearl Harbor shipyard, sixty-seven would be diagnosed
with lung cancer each year. In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp.
1563, 1570 n.10 (D. Haw. 1990). This figure excludes other cancers, of
course, and a per-year count is much lower than a lifetime risk, but it is still
quite low. The same study found "a risk ratio [or relative risk] of cancer
mortality" of between 1.4 and 1.7 for these workers, id.-a number
significantly lower than the 2.0 minimum to which Bendectin and breast-
implant claimants were held.
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actionable emotional distress has been exemplified by the pietA
231
of a mother cradling her mangled or dying son -a trauma-
tableau that extends no recognition to emotional distress inflicted
steadily over time.232 Negligence law, which regards the fear of
cancer that male workers experience steadily over time as well-
founded and often compensable, does not recognize as actionable
in itself the fear derived from past tortious conduct that pervades
many women's lives.233
Gender-divergent outcomes for claims involving the
negligent infliction of fear bespeak fellow-feeling. Approved,
condoned, understandable, containable fear-the fear that comes
wrapped in Smithian propriety234-wins redress. Unlike the
majority of claims for infliction of continuing emotional distress,
these occasions of vulnerability appear to judges well cabined.
The sympathetic spectator sees little need to worry about
unbounded excess in compensation, because he can grasp the
scope of the injury. Less familiar allegations of distress
attributed to tortious conduct, in contrast, open a nearly infinite
void. Our spectator thinks that no one can know where these
alien emotions begin and end. Committed to keeping doctrine
under control, he writes no-duty rules to ward off an abyss.
23 See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989); see generally
Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 520, 522-23 (N.J. 1980). Another leading case,
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 914 (Cal. 1968), featured a dying daughter.
232 See Thing, 771 P.2d at 829 (emphasizing the need to keep a tight rein
on this cause of action). I say "exemplified" based on conversations with
Torts colleagues over the years. Ask a specialist teacher or scholar about
actions for negligent infliction of emotional distress with women as plaintiffs
and he or she will likely mention the Dillon-Portee-Thing bystander question.
233 As far as I know, no plaintiff has ever used negligence doctrine to
recover, or even try to recover, damages for her fear of rape or other
violence from an intimate partner-a fear that in some cases will be much
better grounded in fact than fears of cancer for which asbestos plaintiffs have
won recompense-unless she had already experienced an episode of this
violence. Judges recognize her fear of assault in the future as part of damages
for the historical assault. Were asbestos claims adjudicated with the same
presumed skepticism, emotional distress (including its fear of cancer subset)
would be actionable only insofar as it came after a vivid, indisputable
physical injury linked to asbestos exposure.
234 SMITH, supra note 13, at 16.
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2. Hands-On Caregiving as a Remedy
Despite years of advocacy by academic reformers who favor
expansions, American tort law has kept its commitment to
pecuniary-only remedies for personal injury. A successful
231plaintiff typically receives money and nothing more.
Alternative or supplementary relief following injurious
conduct-an injunction, a court-fostered apology, even a
declaratory judgment-remains rare.
Making one of the bolder proposals to break up this money-
monopoly, the feminist scholar Leslie Bender published two
articles to claim that personal-injury victims need care as well as
money in order to be made whole.236 Payment from a
corporation's treasury or insurer, Bender wrote, is inadequate
because it does not deliver to victims the "direct, personal
services of caregiving."237 As examples of these services that are
omitted from the current remedial menu, Bender mentioned
"shopping, transportation, and arranging for medical
treatments," "feeding and aiding in personal hygiene care," and
"spending time with the injured person and treating her with
dignity and importance.""2 8 Corporate officers, she proposed,
should have "nondelegable duties to provide direct interpersonal
services-time and energy-for the care of their victims or of
persons similarly situated."
23 9
Scorn from the academy ensued,24° and courts manifested no
interest in this proposal. Both Bender and her opponents
235 Cf. Anita Bernstein, Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles
and the Prescription of Masculine Order, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1367, 1376
(2001).
236 Leslie Bender, Changing the Values in Tort Law, 25 TULSA L.J. 759
(1990) [hereinafter Bender, Changing]; Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts:
Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power and Responsibilities,
1990 DUKE L.J. 848 [hereinafter Bender, Feminist (Re)torts].
237 Bender, Changing, supra note 236, at 769.
218 Id. at 769.
239 Id. at 771 (emphasis in original).
240 Id. at 769-70 n.23; see also Bender, Feminist Re(torts), supra note
236, at 905-07. I speak from observation, having been present at one
academic gathering where Bender presented her thesis.
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appeared certain that she had argued for something peculiar.14 1
Understood in a fellow-feeling perspective, however, the Bender
approach to personal-injury responsibility is far from novel or
strange.
The compulsory-caregiving proposal was described as
antithetical to economic analysis: Bender advised her audience to
suppress any misgivings about costs. 2 42 In rejecting dollar
tradeoffs, Bender harkened to a remedy available (especially
back in 1990, when she offered her reform proposal) to asbestos
claimants: medical monitoring, a measure that courts
occasionally grant in defiance of microeconomic basics.
As an option for negotiators trying to resolve mass-exposure
claims, medical monitoring lacks the partisan payoffs that
support other outcomes: It imposes heavy costs on defendants
without necessarily enriching plaintiffs' lawyers the way
monetary settlements do; and presumably many, if not most,
people who have been exposed to a toxin would rather receive
cash than prepaid physical examinations. This aversion continues
when mass-tort pleadings reach the courts. Attempts to receive
class certification for medical monitoring typically fail. 43 Judges
have written cumbersome tests (in some versions, with seven
conjunctive elements for plaintiffs to meet244) that eliminate most
24 "I realize that I am asking a lot of openness of you as a listener,"
Bender wrote, "because my proposal imagines a major change in how we
think about what law is and can do in the name of tort, about how law
understands human relationships, and about how it reflects and implements
our values." Bender, Changing, supra note 236, at 767. In both of its
published incarnations, the proposal appeared without footnotes, except for a
few references to feminist theory, just as one would expect for a novel
"paradigm shift in how lawyers understand responsibility in tort law."
242 If a reader was "prompted to ask 'how much will this cost?' or
'wouldn't it be more efficient or cost-effective to . . . ?' or 'how can we pay
for this?,'" Bender wrote, "please suspend these questions about the
economics of accidents for the time being." Id. at 769.
243 Rory Ryan, Comment, Uncertifiable? The Current States of
Nationwide State Law Class Actions, 54 BAYLOR L. REv. 467, 501-02 (2002)
(reviewing medical monitoring case law).
2' See, e.g., Redland Soccer Club v. Dep't of the Army, 696 A.2d 137,
145-46 (Pa. 1997) (seven elements, with expert testimony required); Hansen
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medical monitoring claims altogether.
With all due sympathy for anyone exposed to asbestos, no
judicial test for this relief can support giving medical monitoring
to these plaintiffs .245 The horror of mesothelioma and lung
cancer is undeniable. 24 Asbestosis produces severe shortness of
breath and can demand supplemental oxygen, an unpleasant set
of effects . 47 Even pleural thickening, a lesser development,
suggests ill health ahead. Yet what entitles plaintiffs to medical
monitoring is not the gravity of their sickness but the benefit that
early detection of a new development can give them.248
v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993) (eight
elements). Crucial for this discussion are two elements that justify this
remedy: early detection must be beneficial, and the regime must be
reasonably necessary according to contemporary scientific principles. Abuan
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 1993); Wyeth, Inc. v. Gottlieb,
930 So. 2d 635 (Fla. App. 2006).
245 Paul F. Rothstein, What Courts Can Do in the Face of the Never-
Ending Asbestos Crisis, 71 Miss. L.J. 1, 20 (2001) ("Medical monitoring,
like recovery for expected future impairment or fear thereof, may have its
place in tort law, but in the asbestos litigation, this device has become a
caricature. ").
246 See Norfolk & W. Rwy. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 155 (2003)
(mentioning that mesothelioma "inflicts 'agonizing, unremitting pain',
relieved only by death") (citation omitted).
247 My father, who had been a plumber's assistant in his youth and then
worked during World War II as an engineer at an infamous asbestos-locus,
the Brooklyn Navy Yard, spent his last decade with oxygen tubes in his
nostrils. His pulmonologist told him he had emphysema. It is extraordinarily
unlikely, however, that a lifelong nonsmoker with no other risk factors would
develop that disease. See Most Emphysema Cases Stem from Smoking, Grand
Rapids Press, Apr. 1, 2009, at B2. I feel certain that it was asbestosis that
brought on the heart attack mentioned on his death certificate. He died a
ghastly death. His inability to breathe had wrecked his ability to eat, and on
his deathbed he, a man of medium height with a big frame, weighed less than
125 pounds.
248 So held the first judicial approval of medical monitoring, a case
brought on behalf of orphans on an airplane at risk of developing treatable
brain damage. Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,
746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor
Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 718 (Mo. 2007) ("[Tlhe purpose of medical
monitoring is to facilitate the early diagnosis and treatment of latent injuries
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Throughout the decades of asbestos litigation, no such showing
has emerged. Once exposed to asbestos, a person cannot
unbreathe the fibers that entered his lungs, nor undo through
monitoring whatever damage lies in store for him.
2 49
In Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.,250 a leading
precedent on medical monitoring for asbestos-exposed plaintiffs,
the plaintiffs had no theory about what prepaid intervention
could do for them, and nothing to support their claim except a
letter from an examining physician calling their exposure
"limited and perhaps inconsequential" and suggesting that they
"may" (not "must" or "had better") come back for new chest x-
rays in a few years.25' The Utah Supreme Court declared that not
only was this letter inadequate to get the plaintiffs past summary
judgment, but that it might also "imply that medical monitoring
is, in fact, unnecessary.,212 Reject the medical-monitoring claim,
then? No. The court remanded to give the plaintiffs moreS 253
opportunity to develop their contention. Later decisions that
approve asbestos-related claims for medical monitoring cite
254Hansen in support of their stance.
caused by exposure to toxins. ") (citation omitted).
249 In the words of the Ninth Circuit:
Here, the plaintiffs have not shown that a treatment exists for
asbestos-related diseases, or that there is clinical value to
administering any such treatment before the onset of symptoms of
these diseases. Plaintiffs maintain that all they seek is a single
baseline medical examination. Yet they have submitted no evidence
that a single examination would yield any clinical benefit.
In re Marine Asbestos Cases, 265 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 2001); see also
Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 79 F.3d 1337, 1347 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding "that Buckley should receive medical monitoring in order to
ensure early detection and cure of any asbestos-related disease he develops"
without pausing to wonder what such a "cure" might be), rev'd, 521 U.S.
424 (1997).
250 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993).
2" Id. at 981 (emphasis supplied).
215 Id. at 981-82.
23 Id. at 982.
2'4 E.g., Patton v. Gen. Signal Corp., 984 F. Supp. 666, 674
(W.D.N.Y. 1997); Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So. 2d 355,
360
FELLOW-FEELING AND GENDER
Rejections of medical monitoring for persons exposed to
asbestos are noteworthy for their lack of scoffing. In Metro-
North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, the Supreme Court
expressed sympathy for the asbestos-exposed plaintiff's desire to
seek ongoing medical attention but found no warrant in the
governing statute, the Federal Employers Liability Act, to give
this relief in a lump sum. Instead, the Court kept open the
possibility of "medical cost recovery rules more finely tailored"
than the "full-blown, traditional, tort law cause of action" to pay
for medical monitoring that the plaintiff had sought. One
incisive critic of asbestos litigation as it has expanded over the
last two decades tells us, with no disapproval, that Congress's
failed fix of this liability crisis would have given medical
monitoring to all victims of exposure, from the barely pleural
Level I through Level IX, the mesothelioma class.256 Gentle
responses indeed to a demand that plainly lacks support in the
law.
Women plaintiffs who want medical monitoring fare
differently, as a leading monitoring-for-men case, In re Paoli
R.R. Yard PCB Litigation,257 pointed out: "Our research has
yielded only two cases in which courts have purported to
disallow recovery based on a medical monitoring theory," wrote
the court. "Both cases are distinguishable."25 They are, by
gender: both involved women exposed to DES. 259 Another group
358 (La. 1998).
255 Metro-North Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 444 (1994).
256 Lester Brickman, An Analysis of the Financial Impact of S. 852: The
Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005, 27 CARDoZO L. REv.
991, 1006-07 (2005).
217 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990).
258 Id. at 851 n.25.
259 Id. In the years following Paoli R.R. Yard, more case law disallowing
medical monitoring emerged, male plaintiffs not excluded. Henderson &
Twerski, supra note 167, at 838 (identifying, in 2002, "recent signs of
stiffening resistance" to medical monitoring in asbestos claims). Assessments
of medical monitoring in law reviews post-Paoli are mostly negative. See,
e.g., Andrew R. Klein, Rethinking Medical Monitoring, 64 BROOK. L. REv.
1 (1998); George W.C. McCarter, Medical Sue-Veillance: A History and
Critique of the Medical Monitoring Remedy in Toxic Tort Litigation, 45
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of women plaintiffs in a multidistrict litigation fell out of luck
when they sought medical monitoring after exposure to the
defendant's harmful hormones: the court said that state
decisional law on medical monitoring contained too much
variety to permit certifying a class for this relief, an
overstatement.26'
The solitary mass-tort success story for women on this front
has been fen-phen. Plaintiffs who took this toxic diet drug-an
overwhelmingly female cohort 262 -filed products liability actions
around the country. These claims were consolidated into a multi-
district litigation in Philadelphia, which ended in a settlement
that included medical monitoring.
RUTGERS L. REv. 227 (1993).
260 In re Prempro Products Liability Litigation, 230 F.R.D. 555, 569
(E.D.Ark. 2005).
26' The variations are trivial: some states regard medical monitoring as a
cause of action in itself and others see it as part of a damages claim; some
state supreme courts have approved it and some have not done so. No state
purports categorically to disallow this remedy. The strongest state-level
stance against it, Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 2001)
(responding to certified question), demands some kind of present injury first,
a criterion that might be fulfilled with reference to some counterpart to
pleural thickening. Even if the variations were not trivial, choice of law rules
permit a resolution. See Ryan, supra note 243, at 501-02 (concluding that
these class certifications are typically possible, though difficult to get).
262 Upon publication of a fen-phen expos6, one writer reflected on the
gendered nature of this toxin:
It's very distressing to tell other members of the media about this
and watch them glaze over. Particularly men. They think: "Diet
drugs, women's problems, who cares?" Then they get all excited
about 200 deaths on the faulty Firestone tires. You look at this
figure: Between the heart valve disease and lung disease, you're
talking several hundred deaths so far. And 45,000 cases of illness.
These are pretty big numbers. At one point, I turned to a reporter
and said, "If one of the side effects of this had caused your dick to
turn black and fall off, it would be a major national story. There's a
money trail, a paper trail, a federal whistleblower. You'd say:
'We've got to jump on this.'"
Janelle Brown, The Poison Pill, SALON, May 16, 2001, http://dir.salon.con/
tech/feature/2001/05/16/mundy-qa.
'6 See In re Diet Drugs Products Liability Litigation, 282 F.3d 220,
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For medical-monitoring purposes, fen-phen could not be
more different from asbestos. The screening device used to
monitor patients, a relatively low-cost technology, reveals fen-
phen's asymptomatic damage to heart valves in time for
effective treatment. Assuming that plaintiffs would get the same
time-of-discovery reprieves on statutes of limitation that asbestos
plaintiffs have long enjoyed, such monitoring saves defendants
money by forestalling severe harm and thereby making the
claims cheaper. Heart screening via echocardiogram is not part
of a routine office visit, and so fen-phen plaintiffs cannot forfeit
their medical monitoring claim on that ground, as did women
who sought medical monitoring for breast cancer after having
ingested the dangerous synthetic hormones that their doctors
prescribed. 26  Like DES plaintiffs, hormone-replacement
plaintiffs were rebuffed with the statement that ordinary
gynecological checkups would give them all the monitoring they
need.
We begin to see a possible explanation here for the gender
gap with respect to medical monitoring. Decisionmakers may
assume, consciously or not, that women should be denied this
relief because they already monitor themselves. Men need
indulgence and support to coax them toward more medical
care. 165 If fellow-feeling must stretch and rewrite doctrine to
achieve that result, so be it.
The stereotype that men don't go to the doctor-or that they
are especially inclined to avoid the postponable, non-crisis office
225-27 (3d Cir. 2002) (describing the litigation history).
264 See Wyeth, Inc., v. Gottlieb, 930 So. 2d 635 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006); Albertson v. Wyeth, Inc., 2005 LEXIS Phil. Ct. Common Pleas 604
(May 3, 2005); see also supra note 260 and accompanying text (referencing
the Arkansas MDL, In re Prempro Products Liability Litigation).
265 The racially and economically diverse county in which I live
maintains a public-relations initiative called "Take Your Man to the Doctor-
He'll Live to Love You Longer." Press release, Office of the President of the
Borough of Brooklyn, Sept. 20, 2005, http://www.brooklyn-usa.org/Press/
2005/sep20b.htm; see also Sari Harrar, A Healthier Husband, GOOD
HOUSEKEEPING, http://www.goodhousekeeping.com/health/healthy-husband-
diet-exercise-lifestyle (subtitled "How to get him to shape up-without nagging
or driving yourself crazy").
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visits that are a kind of patient-initiated and -financed medical
monitoring-has statistical support. Studies show that women go
to physicians for prevention at more than twice the rate of
men.2 66 "Men make 150 million fewer trips to doctors than
women each year," says the University of Iowa hospital, adding
parenthetically that "this doesn't even include women's
pregnancy-related visits. ,267 More vulnerable than women to
stress-related illnesses, men comprise only a fifth of the registry
in stress-management programs. 26' They lag behind women on a
host of self-monitoring behaviors: sunscreen use, blood pressure
checks, compliance with prescription-medicine regimens, flu
vaccination, commitment to safe-sex practices, avoidance of
cigarettes and alcohol, and modifications to unhealthful diets.269
The percentage of women who say they regularly examine their
breasts exceeds the percentage of men who "even know how to
perform a testicular self-exam." 270 Although men use the Internet
more than women for most categories of queries and needs,
health is an exception: women predominate among "online
health seekers," on their own behalf and others' .
Demographers credit wifely "nagging" about health care as one
266 Karen Goldberg Goff, Male Fear of Physicians-American Academy of
Family Physicians Survey, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Apr. 24, 2004, available
at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_ml571/is_15_16/ai_62024138.
267 University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, Why Men Don't Go to the
Doctor, http://www.uihealthcare.com/reports/urology/030609menshealth.
remove.html [hereinafter Iowa Report].
268 Id.
269 id.
"'o Compare The Breast Self-Examination Pad, http://www.bse-pad.com/
("only twenty-nine percent perform self-exams on a regular basis") with Iowa
Report, supra note 267 ("3/4 of men don't even know how to perform a
testicular self-exam"). Because testicular cancer, with its lifetime risk of 1 in
150, is so much rarer than breast cancer, the choice not to examine oneself
for symptoms may seem reasonable-except that the condition is relatively
easy to cure if someone finds it, harder to cure in its late stages; younger
men, who are most vulnerable to this cancer, generally eschew doctors'
offices, and so they need an alternative to examination by a physician.
271 Women Top Men in Seeking Health Care Info, REUTERS, Aug. 28,
2007. True to another stereotype, women use the Internet more than men to
obtain travel directions. Id.
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reason for the big gap in life expectancy between married men
272
and single men.
Courts that award medical monitoring with exceptional
generosity to asbestos plaintiffs extend the tradition of
affectionate nagging as a route to health for the male
bourgeoisie-time to go for your chest x-ray, dear; it's free-by
shifting costs away from the men who benefit from this
intervention. It is a truism that customers of defendant
businesses and the taxpaying public underwrite tort liability;
women are not exempted from contributing.2 73 A wife who
makes appointments for her husband to see the doctor, focuses
on his worrisome symptoms when he doesn't, shops for and
cooks the type of food that promotes his health, and refills or
picks up his prescriptions presumably receives something in
return for her labors, even if she never gets any medical
monitoring of her own from the marriage. We infer as much
because she can opt out of the household, at least in theory. She
cannot opt out of paying into the nearly bottomless asbestos pit.
Nobody can.274 Judges who award male plaintiffs a type of costly
relief that they generally deny to women thus impose an
injustice in a way that traditional marital arrangements do not. If
272 LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE:
WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF
FINANCIALLY 55 (2000).
273 African-American personal-injury litigants receive lower
compensatory damage awards than their white counterparts. Frank M.
McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort Reform: Searching for Racial Justice, 48
RUTGERS L. REV. 761, 786 (1996). Even if their lower wage income (and not
bigotry against them in the civil justice system) explains this gap, black
customers are still not receiving the price discount on consumer goods that
they should receive in exchange for less compensation after the products
injure them. See also David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing
Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 210, 230
(1996) (noting that enterprise liability necessarily prices "many
consumers . . . out of the market for the good or service in question" and
denies work to "prospective employees;" moreover, "[tihose willing to pay
the higher prices and accept the lower wages because they lack better
alternatives still suffer a decrease in net benefits from the transaction").
274 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (summarizing severe social
costs).
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women who are already going to the doctor make a claim for
medical monitoring that would succeed when made by male
claimants, then distributive justice calls for these women to
receive what they seek, without getting docked for their salutary
habits of self-care.
Not being free to rule against women and in favor of men
overtly because they think women already monitor themselves
(and pay the price of this monitoring, at least in self-discipline
and often in cash) while men need nurture in the form of paid-
for scheduled office visits, judges can get tangled trying to assert
a gender-neutral justification for what they have decided.
Vitanza v. Wyeth, Inc., another hormone-replacement decision
that came out against women who had sought medical
monitoring, illustrates the tangle .27 The trial court explained to
plaintiffs that the governing law comes from New Jersey, where
products liability law is statutory, and under the state's Product
Liability Act, one needs "harm" to recover anything, including
paid-for surveillance. So far, you have no harm, the court said.
Come back when you're hurt.
But what about decisional law of the state's highest court,
which approved medical monitoring following toxic exposures?,
the plaintiffs wanted to know. One case, Ayers, had involved
contamination of an aquifer; 6 the other, Mauro, followed
workplace asbestos exposure.2 7' The court admitted that the
Vitanza hormone-replacement plaintiffs had met "every element"
of the Ayers criteria and would have been entitled to their
medical-monitoring claim had that precedent governed. It was
thus forced to distinguish the earlier medical-monitoring
decisions. Asbestos workers and contaminated-water consumers
could receive medical monitoring because they had brought an
environmental tort claim, said the court. The Vitanza plaintiffs
had only a products liability claim.
What's the difference between the two? The court fumbled.
275 Vitanza v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 2093-04, 2006 WL 462470 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. Jan. 24, 2006).
276 Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
277 Mauro v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 561 A.2d 257, 258-63 (N.J. 1989).
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"The main reasons that prompted the New Jersey Supreme
Court to allow medical monitoring in Ayers," it answered, "was
that the nature of environmental tort actions made proving and
establishing causation extremely difficult for plaintiffs and also,
the lack of a governmental response to providing compensation
for victims of toxic exposure forced a need for a judicial
remedy.", 78 Neither reason applies to a hormone-replacement
claim, the court said. 27 9 And neither reason makes a lot of sense,
either. Difficulty in proving causation does not support giving
plaintiffs medical monitoring, and it does not rule out medical
monitoring for hormone-replacement claims, which pose difficult
questions of causation after patients suffer harm. As for the lack
of government-paid compensation, that too does not distinguish
the two cases.
The Vitanza court wrote an equally telling review of the
New Jersey Supreme Court's two decisions on medical
monitoring for asbestos plaintiffs. ° In one, the court granted
this relief; in the other, decided four years later, the court
refused it. Neither plaintiff was yet ill; both had evidence to
show that their lungs had been hurt. The winning plaintiff,
Roger Mauro, had been exposed while working as a repairman,
plumber, and steamfitter in a psychiatric hospital. The losing
plaintiff, Rosa Marie Theer, had been exposed while washing
her husband's clothes. She would have been a fine candidate for
medical monitoring if the court had applied the Ayers rationale:
(1) she could expect to have difficulty, even more than would
Mr. Mauro, in "proving and establishing causation," and (2) she
apparently had received no government compensation for her
injury. But over the four years between the two cases, the New
Jersey Supreme Court somehow had learned that medical
monitoring is a remedy "not easily invoked." 8' Roger Mauro
might have needed a fellow-feeling boost in order to invoke it so
easily.
278 Vitanza, 2006 WL 462470, at *8 (citing Ayers, 106 N.J. at 581-86).
279 id.
280 Vitanza, 2006 WL 462470, at *5-6.
28 Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 628 A.2d 724, 724-33 (N.J. 1993).
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B. Fellow-Feeling Casts Blame Beyond Defendants
Personal injury law will occasionally purport to be
indifferent to blame. Strict liability, for example, is imposed
without a showing of fault by the defendant. Some affirmative
defenses defeat a claim even when the plaintiff can prove the
defendant is blameworthy."' These exceptions noted, blame
pervades personal injury law, particularly when advocates and
factfinders try to identify which of two conflicting outcomes
would be the fair one.
Any effects of fellow-feeling on personal injury law will be
manifest in the ascribing and withholding of blame. We may
again observe that Adam Smith, who published The Theory of
Moral Sentiments before modem tort law took form a century
later, did not discuss civil responsibility for personal injury;2 83
but on a related subject, responsibility for crimes, he made the
non-utilitarian argument that punishment should align with social
feelings and attitudes about the crime in question rather than
with gains to the public good. 2 4 Fellow-feeling, he wrote by way
of example, makes an ordinary person shudder to hear that a
sentinel was put to death following military law for the crime of
falling asleep at his post, whereas the death penalty for "a cruel
murtherer or atrocious criminall" would seem all right to this
spectator. 2"5 Either blame or an overt refusal to blame
accompanies fellow-feeling in response to adversity.
In personal injury adjudication, a determination that there is
no liability does not equate to a determination of no blame.
Instead, what it can mean is that the factfinder has assigned
blame-informally, making no record-for the injury to someone
other than the defendant. The ascription of informal, unofficial,
and yet implacable blame is a familiar topic in feminist legal
writing, which has identified numerous contexts where women
282 These affirmative defenses include statutes of limitation, see supra
Part I.D., and preemption, see DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 940
(2d ed. Thomson/West 2008).
m See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
2" RAPHAEL, supra note 3, at 111.
2w Id.
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receive blame for their own misfortune.2 6
For example, the attorney for the manufacturer of an
intrauterine device asked a litigant at her deposition whether she
wore pantyhose and "what fabric was used in the crotch."2"7 "I'll
answer that," said the plaintiff to the opposing lawyer, "but this
sounds more like an obscene phone call than anything else."""
The question was irrelevant because pantyhose "can't cause PID
[pelvic inflammatory disease, the condition that the plaintiff
attributed to the defendant's product]; not even defense experts
suggested they could."8 9 Defense lawyers in the Dalkon Shield
litigation were on somewhat more relevant ground when they
asked plaintiffs how many sexual partners they had had, because
of the positive relation between the number of partners and the
incidence of PID. But not much more: the connection is a bare
correlation only, and Robins, manufacturer of the Dalkon
Shield, never had to explain how more partners necessarily
equals more infectious bacteria. The Ninth Circuit agreed with
two plaintiffs that such testimony was probably irrelevant and
prejudicial, but did not disturb the trial judge's decision because
of the lenity of its abuse of discretion standard.29°
286 See, e.g., "Failure to Protect" Working Group, Charging Battered
Mothers with Failure to Protect: Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 849 (2000); Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn't She Just Report
Him?, 51 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 117, 119-21 (1995) (summarizing reasons,
including self-blame, for the decision of harassed workers not to denounce
their harassers); Kimari Paul-Emile, The Charleston Policy: Substance or
Abuse?, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 325, 326 (1999) (analyzing a practice of
prosecuting "substance-dependant pregnant women under the state's child
endangerment laws"), Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers, Myths, and the Law of
Divorce: One More Feminist Case for Partnership, 13 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 203, 218 n.80 (2006) (objecting to the use of "rehabilitation"
as applied to alimony, as if ex-wives were "criminals in need of rescue from
their lives of vice").
2S7 id.
288 MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND
THE DALKON SHIELD 195 (1985).
289 id.
290 Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., 764 F.2d 1329, 1339-40 (9th Cir.
1985).
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Arriving at the heyday of a sexual revolution, the Dalkon
Shield bequeathed on American products liability litigation a
practice of portraying plaintiffs as befouled from having put
their reproductive anatomy to uses of pleasure, rather than
accepting pregnancy as the wages of coitus.29' The long-held
popular association between unchastity and every means of birth
control, not just this intrauterine device,' 92 coupled with liberal
discovery rules enabled lawyers defending Dalkon Shield to
presume each woman soiled and ask her whatever "obscene
phone call"-like questions they wished. This defamation slurs
women outside products liability litigation as well. The
memorable phrase that journalist David Brock coined to attack
one famed female accuser, "a bit nutty, and a bit slutty,"
293
291 Or befouled even from their poor hygiene, as Robins lawyers implied
by asking about pantyhose and, at the deposition of another Dalkon Shield
plaintiff, "which way she wiped." MINTZ, supra note 288, at 195. Lawyers
directed the plaintiff not to answer this question and others about "whether,
and how often, she engaged in oral and anal intercourse and used so-called
marital aids. Five months later, however, a judge compelled her to return to
the Twin Cities to answer the questions." Id.
292 See People v. Sanger, 118 N.E. 637, 637 (N.Y. 1918) (upholding,
"for the benefit of the health and morals of the community," the conviction
of activist Margaret Sanger for distributing contraceptive devices and
information about pregnancy prevention); Lorraine Schmall, Birth Control as
a Labor Law Issue, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 139, 142-43 (2006)
(recounting the crusade against contraception begun by Anthony Comstock
and continuing in the practices of contemporary pharmacists). On the
indecency of these technologies as seen even by a sophisticated jurist, see id.
at 143 (citing United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737, 737-40 (2d Cir.
1936) (Hand, J.) ("There seems to me substantial reason for saying that
contraceptives were meant to be forbidden, whether or not prescribed by
physicians, and that no lawful use of them was contemplated.")).
293 See David Brock, The Real Anita Hill, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR,
Mar. 1992, at 18; see also infra note 331 (referring to the "nutty, slutty
defense" as used in a media report about a rape charge). Ten years later, too
late to undo the damage, Brock recanted his words. See DAVID BROCK,
BLINDED BY THE RIGHT: THE CONSCIENCE OF AN Ex-CONSERVATIVE 98
(2002) ("Not even the Spectator had ever seen the likes of the sexist imagery
and sexual innuendo I confected to discredit Anita Hill. These were but two
ingredients in a witches' brew of fact, allegation, hearsay, speculation,
opinion, and invective labeled by my editors as 'investigative journalism.'").
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exploited a belief that extensive sexual experience, often a
source of pride for men, causes or evinces untrustworthiness in
a female complainant or witness. 94 When a physician brought an
action against the New York Health and Hospitals Corporation
for the HIV infection she attributed to a carelessly discarded
needle, the lawyer for the city asked her on cross-examination
about her abortion history, even though an abortion cannot
transmit a virus or make a woman more likely to become
infected. 29' The lawyer also asked about her sexual past, even
though the two men she had named as her only partners had
both tested negative for HIV.29'
The notion that female plaintiffs are worth less because of
their past sexual activity can lower the value of their claims-
even if defendants do not broach the subject-emerged in a
noted fen-phen lawsuit.297 "We were so disappointed the trial
settled," one juror told a lawyer for the deceased plaintiff, Mary
Linnen. "We really were going to give the Linnens a billion
dollars." 298 Mary Linnen's father was motivated to settle for
much less-in part because his daughter had died before
marrying her fianc6 (she had taken fen-phen in hopes of losing
twenty-five pounds before her wedding), and he knew that a trial
would expose the fact of her premarital cohabitation.2 9
Defendants unwilling or unable to slut-shame their female
294 See, e.g., JESSICA VALENTI, HE'S A STUD, SHE'S A SLUT, AND 49
OTHER DOUBLE STANDARDS EVERY WOMAN SHOULD KNOW (2008).
295 Carol Agus, Prego Gets $1.5M in AIDS-Suit Settlement; 'Now, My
Only Dream Is a Cure', NEWSDAY, Mar. 9, 1990, at 3. "It was totally
irrelevant to the whole case," the plaintiff, Dr. Veronica Prego, later told a
reporter. "The only way you could get AIDS in an abortion was with
transfusions. So he could have asked about transfusions without asking about
abortions. But he asked about abortions and never asked about transfusions. It
was done in an attempt to embarrass me." Id.
296 id.
297 See generally ALICIA MUNDY, DISPENSING WITH THE TRUTH (2001).
298 Id. at 367.
299 Id. at 324-25. The Linnens had also been put through a wrenching
subpoena that demanded the funeral home condolence book, all sympathy
notes and cards that they had received following Mary's death, and a list of
all who had attended the graveside service. Id. at 185.
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adversaries have other victim-blaming devices at hand. The fen-
phen record shows several of them. Not every plaintiff in this
litigation had committed a sexual act worth mentioning, but all
had taken the drug to lose weight. The Linnen trial featured an
opening statement by a defense lawyer who claimed Mary
Linnen had been 5'3" and weighed 193 pounds at the time of
her death; she was actually 5'7," and had started using fen-phen
when her weight reached 170.' 00 Fat women-or, as one e-mail
message typed by a physician who worked for the defendant had
shouted in his attack on them, FAT WOMEN3 01-made a ready
target for shame and blame. 30 2 Another fen-phen plaintiff was
attacked for having smoked, even though smoking has no
connection to the injuries for which these women filed claims. °3
It can also appear natural for mothers to receive blame for
the adversities that their children experience. Before fen-phen
was identified as a culprit in heart valve diagnoses, physicians
struggled to find the cause of heart valve disease in young
women. Asthma and bronchitis, both common conditions, were
frequently available; when the patient had never experienced
either one, physicians reached for childhood rheumatic fever, a
condition "all but eradicated in the 1950s and 1960s. "304 The
mother of one plaintiff, Julee Montgomery, had "insisted to
doctors that Julee had never had rheumatic fever. But the
" "She had just painted Mary Linnen as a troll." Id. at 324. The
statement was not a careless mistake; the lawyer went out of her way to say
"five three . . my height." Id.
301 "Now everything is clear. The coordinated attack on REDUX [part of
the fen-phen combination] during the past few weeks is part of a conspiracy-
led by FAT WOMEN . . . to make EVERYONE fat, by keeping away the
only effective medications to keep people from becoming so .... " Id. at
108 (quoting the physician's e-mail message).
Jane Byeff Korn, Fat, 77 B.U. L. REv. 25, 29-37 (1997) (describing
the intersection of weight and gender as a locus of discrimination); Elizabeth
E. Theran, "Free to Be Arbitrary and. .Capricious:" Weight-Based
Discrimination and the Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 11
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 113, 144 (2001) (arguing that weight-related
oppression functions to hold back the advances of feminism).
" MUNDY, supra note 297, at 210.
id. at 217-18.
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doctors were convinced that Julee's mother was wrong. Perhaps
she had been inattentive, even negligent. A bad mother. She
must have missed it when Julee was a child."3 °5 Rheumatic fever
is hard to miss.'06
The asbestos contrast emerges with particular force when
one reviews the judicial response to plaintiffs' coming to court
as current or former smokers. In his study of developments in
apportionment, Michael Green finds three judicial approaches to
cancer claims that combine asbestos exposure with exposure to
cigarette smoke. Courts in the first group assess the relative
contribution of each input (asbestos and smoking) to the risk of
cancer. Courts in the second group simply refuse to take the
smoking into account. The third approach looks at smoking as a
plaintiff's-conduct defense, requiring the defendant to prove that
the plaintiff's smoking was negligent.0 7
Because cigarette smoke is a significantly more potent
carcinogen than asbestos, this balance appears awry, not
consistent with the apportionment rules that plaintiffs face in
other products liability actions. The first approach is sound (with
Green's important reminder-caveat that only tortious inputs
should be subject to apportionment: in order to count, the
cigarette smoking, whether done by the plaintiff or third parties,
must have been wrongful).3 8 But it is not a majority rule. The
second approach, which ignores a pertinent history, blatantly
denies reality to favor plaintiffs. The third, shifting the burden
of production to defendants, has been occasionally unfair to
defendants in application, as has the first.309
305 Id.
'0' Gene H. Stollerman, Rheumatic Fever, 349 LANCET 935 (1997)
(describing symptoms, which include severe pain, and noting that "[t]he
diagnostic criteria have not changed since their definitive description by
William Cheadle, in 1889 . . ").
3 Michael D. Green, A Future for Asbestos Apportionment?, 12 CONN.
INs. L.J. 315, 333 (2006).
3 Id. at 341.
0 Id. at 324 n.40 (putting in the third category Rutherford v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997), which affirmed an improbable jury
determination that the decedent's fault in maintaining a pack-a-day smoking
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That the smoker/cancer/worker subset of asbestos plaintiffs
could ever succeed in showing that asbestos exposure more
probably than not caused their lung cancer is difficult to explain
without reference to the plaintiffs' gender. All of their claims-
in substance, "I have cancer because I was exposed to
asbestos"-were almost always not true enough to meet the
preponderance standard. If the claims were ever true in
particular instances, the truth was fortuitous and unknowable.
Against these cold facts, however, stood laboring men,
breadwinners of the working class. These cancer plaintiffs had
smoked, but because their friends and families smoked or to
ease the stress of earning their living in a factory or railroad
yard, not because they lacked regard for their own wellbeing or
sought to encounter a risk. At work, each man was wrongfully
exposed to asbestos, a hazardous substance, and later he was
stricken with a deadly disease.
Each lung-cancer plaintiff can win against an asbestos
defendant only with the help of empathy. Tort doctrine, coldly
demanding that he eliminate the more likely source of his injury,
is not on his side. And so I speculate that looking at this litigant,
judges and defense lawyers experience fellow-feeling amounting
almost to brotherhood. These adversaries and neutrals feel no
such connection in the presence of litigants who say they were
sickened or maimed by synthetic estrogen, diet drugs, morning-
sickness drugs, intrauterine devices, lactation suppressants,
miscarriage preventatives, hormonal birth-control implants,
tampons, or slabs of silicone inserted surgically into breasts to
make them bigger. When they face women in an adverse
medical state attributable to a product defect, especially a
gynecological state-miscarrying, mourning their inability to
become pregnant, giving birth to deformed children-they do not
see themselves. Their fellow-feeling appears more readily stirred
by business managers who tried to meet demand by supplying
habit for 30 years contributed only 2.5% to his lung cancer); Altiere v.
Fibreboard Corp., 617 A.2d 1302, 1303 (Pa. Super. 1992) (fear-of-cancer
case with present asbestosis featuring a plaintiff who "was a heavy smoker;"
the court refused an apportionment instruction because the statistical evidence
on what inputs cause which cancers was too imprecise).
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goods to a market of consumers, only to be ambushed by a
problem that few could foresee.
CONCLUSION
Doctrine in the United States is stringent when litigants try
to hold defendants responsible for injuring them. Barriers keep
plaintiffs from jurors who might be moved to compensate them
out of what critics have called sympathy.31° Agreeing that
sympathy flourishes in personal injury liability, this Article has
found this force in new places. Observers, including jurors and
judges, feel connected to litigants who put them in mind of
themselves. Their feeling of sympathetic connection to these
persons impels them to relax the stringent requirements of
hornbook tort law. Four key aspects of this fellow-feeling-its
inclination to focus on one person or side at a time; its
involuntary origins; its tendency to make people feel good; and
its social effects-manifest in personal injury liability. Fellow-
feeling explains some recurrent favoritisms.
The favoritism that this Article has addressed extends
unacknowledged (and perhaps unconscious) kindnesses to some
male participants in personal injury liability, while withholding
the same kindnesses from female plaintiffs. I acknowledge the
strong null hypothesis that opposes my contention. Any charge
of gender bias made in the twenty-first century United States,
when persons who feel challenged by the accusation seldom are
willing to agree that they treated one gender better and the other
worse for no good reason, has a row of persuasion to hoe. What
is to one observer a record of undefended and undertheorized
preference will not look the same to all others. Throughout the
Article, accordingly, I have tried to support my contention about
fellow-feeling in one particular male-gendered category of
claims by making side-by-side references to women's personal-
injury claims, arguing that these like cases have not been treated
alike."
30 See generally Feigenson, Sympathy, supra note 5.
31 Cf. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 118-19 (Martin Ostwald
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Readers who doubt this thesis might deem the differences
among my examples more salient than the similarities, or
maintain that the defective product I have associated with male
plaintiffs is so different from every other source of personal
injury that it cannot stand in for a separate category like
gender.3t2 In response, I can only commend renewed attention to
asbestos case law. The liberalities and dispensations bestowed on
this group of plaintiffs, catalogued only in part in this Article,313
are extraordinary. They amount to the very antithesis of rigor.
Anyone looking for the strict criteria, bright lines, categorical
rules, and outcome-determinative syllogisms found in American
personal injury law must go where the women are.
Having discussed litigants, jurors, and judges, this Article
closes with a few words about the occupational group whose
role in personal injury law has received only passing attention so
far.314 Asbestos lawyers have received considerable attention
away from this Article.3 5 Most of this commentary has been
scathing; almost all of it has focused on lawyers who
represented plaintiffs. To even the imbalance in the discourse, I
start with attorneys for defendants.
A key problem with fellow-feeling in an adversarial context
is that it undermines assigned-role duties to suppress its
impulses. Observers affronted by the lapses of asbestos
plaintiffs' lawyers-witness coaching, stirring up litigation of
trans., 1962) (stating a principle that things that are alike ought to be treated
alike).
32 See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Inds. v. Balbos, 578 A.2d 228, 231 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1990) (calling asbestos liability "the Apocalyptic Beast," a
sobriquet connoting uniqueness).
... See supra Parts III and IV. "Only in part," because after a point I just
stopped looking for these instances; because the Article says little about
indulgences from defendants and their lawyers; and because I took time for
only a quick exploration of how the social phenomenon of women-blaming,
see supra Part VI.B, affects personal-injury liability.
3"4 I try to fill in some of this gap in Bernstein, supra note 122
(describing the "Asbestos Achievements" of plaintiffs' lawyers).
31' See infra notes 316-21 and accompanying text.
316 Brickman, supra note 256, at 999; Griffin B. Bell, Asbestos and the
Sleeping Constitution, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 1, 7 (2003).
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dubious merit,' 17 recruiting medical experts to testify without due
regard for the truth,3 8 collecting extremely high fees,31 9 and
other misdeeds32-were curiously untroubled by the disloyalty to
clients, in crucial ways a worse wrong,"' exhibited on the other
side of the caption. If fellow-feeling affected asbestos jurors and
judges in the way this Article has claimed, it also caused defense
lawyers to pull their punches. If lawyers had defended asbestos
claims by going after their adversaries at anywhere near the
pitch that defense lawyers routinely use against women
plaintiffs, their clients (and the American public) would have
paid a much lower liability bill.322
Asbestos plaintiffs' lawyers, a cohort dominated by men,
placed themselves in an interesting position by choosing to
represent both this group of injured workers and products-
"' Brickman, supra note 256, at 997; Milo Geyelin & Michael J.
McCarthy, Judge Chides Lawyers in Asbestos Claims, WALL ST. J., Jun. 7,
1990, at B10 (describing two Texas lawyers who, rolling through Texas in a
van and visiting asbestos plants offering x-rays to workers, signed up 6000
litigants).
318 Behrens & Goldberg, supra note 202, at 482; Bernstein, Junk
Science, supra note 30, at 13.
319 Brickman, supra note 256, at 995.
320 In his article about the ethics of asbestos lawyers, Lester Brickman
adds other charges. Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation,
33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 833 (2005) (mentioning solicitation, conflicts of
interest, and violations of statutes). He accuses defense lawyers of
misbehavior too. See, e.g., id. at 890-91 (mentioning defense conflicts of
interest).
32, Disloyalty is not only more a fundamental ill than hyperpartisan
excess; it is also much harder to locate and resist. An adversary can be
counted on to care about and protest a breach of ethics that threatens the
adversary's client. No such safeguard exists to protect a client from a lawyer
too devoted to fraternal norms about not treating a fellow like a girl to assert,
for example, that a Daubert precedent disadvantaging female plaintiffs should
be applied to his adversary's asbestos claim.
322 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (referring to the high social
costs of this liability). For their part, judges-state actors-apparently did not
believe that the law of equal protection obliged them to treat male
complainants no less harshly and skeptically than they treat female
complainants.
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liability claimants generally. On one hand, they advocated for
victims inside the empathy circle, the men who supported their
families and did nothing worse at their dangerous jobs than
smoke. On the other hand, these lawyers also advocated against
synthetic estrogen, diet drugs, morning-sickness drugs,
intrauterine devices, lactation suppressants and so on. They have
been winners at the asbestos game, but when away from
asbestos cases this cohort of lawyers more often loses, in part
because of victim-blaming.323 Lead paint, Daubert as applied to
female litigants, statutes of limitation for sexual-abuse actions,
offensive collateral estoppels, emotional distress, medical
monitoring, attempts to aggregate claims, and other battles
surveyed in this Article yield a bad win-loss tally for plaintiffs,
along with their lawyers. Yet these advocates made asbestos-
liability critics tremble.
When they sided with women against men in long-odds drug
products liability actions, these lawyers, unlike their asbestos-
exposed clients, strayed from the brotherhood version of fellow-
feeling that would have connected them to their adversaries and
the other men who managed this litigation. Anyone looking at
their client roster would see that even though plaintiffs' lawyers
stuck up for salt-of-the-earth laborers, these men must not be
committed only to a brotherhood, because they also stuck up for
women, advocating for them as if these complainants were not
lying or crazy or both.2 4 In this light, a man who would
champion women in a products liability action appears money-
motivated at best; he might even believe that women are entitled
to use the law for their own ends and against entities dominated
by the other gender. These male advocates were suspect, in
short.3"5 Plaintiffs' lawyers (their clients emphatically put aside
323 See supra Part IV.B.
324 See infra note 325.
325 When John Edwards, who had earned a fortune bringing neonatal-
injury lawsuits against hospitals and obstetricians, ran for president in 2007
as the only plaintiffs' lawyer in the race, he (alone among the dozen or so
men whose campaigns drew national attention) had to deal with repeated
sneering on the subject of his manhood. See Howard Kurtz, Bad Hair Day?,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Apr. 24, 2007 (referring to several gendered
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for this purpose) went on to receive virtually all the blame for
asbestos liability run amok, in terms that go beyond
disagreement into white-hot revulsion and fury.
326
So deplored by these angry critics, the gargantuan scale of
asbestos liability nevertheless suggests that kindness rooted in
fellow-feeling has its social uses. Any Article about the effects
of asbestos liability should note what it achieved.327 Suppliers
who knew that exposure to their product was dangerous yet
failed to warn workers had their "outrageous misconduct"
brought to light.32 Injured persons received compensation. Other
positive effects included enhancements for "the fund of social
knowledge, and, ultimately, for consumer welfare."32 9 More to
the point of this Article, although not an especially positive
consequence: Women received wealth transfers from asbestos
liability, because exposed men who win compensation for
asbestosis, mesothelioma, or lung cancer typically do not live to
enjoy the money, which passes to their widows. Gender-fairness
also obliges me to note that women were disproportionately
spared-that is, excluded from-employment in lung-poisoning
workplaces.330
epithets, including "Breck Girl," "Material Boy," and "metrosexual");
Charles P. Pierce, The Beauty Contest, ESQUIRE, Aug. 1, 2007, available at
http://www.esquire.com/features/edwardscontest0807 (recalling that one
commentator had called Edwards, at the time married for decades to the
mother of his children, "a faggot").
326 See, e.g., Thomas Grillo, After 8 Years, a Milestone in Battle over
Mold, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 25, 2003, at Al ("[Gireedy lawyers looking for
the next cash cow as asbestos lawsuits diminish"); Stuart Taylor, Jr., The
Greedy vs. the Sick: Lawyers Are Using Asbestos Claims to Cheat the Rest of
Us, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 30, 2002, at 60.
327 For elaboration, see Bernstein, supra note 122.
328 1 borrow the title of a book about asbestos liability before and after a
landmark federal decision. PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE
ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 42 (1985) (linking Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1974) to revelations about industry
knowledge)).
329 Marshall S. Shapo, Millennial Torts, 33 GA. L. REV. 1021, 1031
(1999) (summarizing some consequences of asbestos litigation).
" Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States: Triumph
and Failure of the Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255, 260 n.9
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Injustices surveyed here thus invoke recognition respect and
equal treatment before the law, more than a material shortfall.
Male-dominated cohorts of litigants who made accusations about
one defective product received attention, empathy, and support
in the courts that female-dominated cohorts making accusations
about product defects did not and do not receive. This
difference, which comports with a larger pattern prevailing when
women publicly impugn men or male-governed entities, pertains
to law and policy beyond personal injury liability. 33' Observers
(2006) ("Most asbestos workers are male."). The most dangerous jobs in the
United States-fishing, logging, and flying airplanes-are male-dominated.
Les Christie, America's Most Dangerous Jobs, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 17,
2006, http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/07pf/
2006_most dangerous-jobs/index.htm. Yet "it is worth noting that working
in a hospital is more dangerous than mining coal. Nursing homes report more
on-the-job injuries than steel mills. Grocery workers are injured more
frequently than lumberjacks." Fay Hansen, It's Safe Behind the Desk,
WORKFORCE MGMT., Nov. 19, 2007, at 14. An ethnographic study of street
prostitutes in Britain found an array of dangers for these women workers, not
limited to client violence. Teela Sanders, The Risks of Street Prostitution:
Punters, Police, and Protesters, 41 URBAN STUDIES 1703, 1704 (2004). One
might also wonder about the safety of long work shifts in hair, nail, and
tanning storefronts. See Tonya Turner, Poisonous Perfection, COURIER MAIL,
Mar. 15, 2007, at 42 (reporting on methyl methacrylate, a toxic chemical
used in Australian nail salons).
"3 See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text (noting the Clarence
Thomas-Anita Hill controversy). Reactions to rape complaints provide
another illustration of gendered fellow-feeling as a social phenomenon.
Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a
Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1013 (1991)
(detailing the tendency to disbelieve rape complainants). As Torrey shows,
the gender pattern in fellow-feeling is one of disbelief toward female
accusers, not spectators' favoring their own gender; those who respond
skeptically to rape claims include women as well as men. Id. at 1039-40
(reviewing social science evidence); see also BERNARD LEFKOWITZ, OUR
Guys: THE GLEN RIDGE RAPE AND THE SECRET LIFE OF THE PERFECT
SUBURB (1997) (recounting how a community united to support and defend
high-school athletes who raped a mentally retarded girl); Katheryn Russell-
Brown, Black Protectionism as a Civil Rights Strategy, 53 BUFF. L. REv. 1,
42-43 (2005) (noting that "the Black community roundly denounced" the
young African-American woman who reported being raped by the boxer
Mike Tyson, accusing her somewhat contradictorily of extreme nfiiv~t6, for
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concerned about the inequalities, partialities, and asymmetrical
sympathies that still blight American personal injury law ought
to reflect on fellow-feeling.
not knowing what to expect when she visited a man in his hotel room, and
also being "a scheming gold-digger"); Bryant Attorneys Will Use 'Nutty,
Slutty' Defense, MSNBCNEwS.COM, Aug. 23, 2004, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5789268 (referring to a charge of sexual
assault brought against a star NBA player).

